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Executive Summary
My dissertation studies issues of competition and investment in Internet markets, and it is di-
vided into three parts: the first chapter provides a general analysis of platform competition, which
can be applied to Internet markets such as mobile applications, online advertisements and search,
as well as more traditional markets such as credit cards, video games and shopping malls; the sec-
ond and third chapters present two models to help understand the markets for cloud computing
and cybersecurity.
Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms com-
peting in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided
markets are dynamic—rather than merely static—I show that switching costs lower the first-period
price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided
markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network
externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase
in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side.
Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand
is uncertain and correlated. Before demand is realized, two firms decide to invest in their local
capacity. Provider(s) of flexible resource observe these decisions and invest in their capacity. After
demand is realized, firms buy flexible resource if demand exceeds their local capacity. I find that
market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while
competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation
and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap,
the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship
becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on
some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing.
Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity in which the software
vendor can invest ex ante and ex post. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules
as means of increasing security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability
rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post because the software vendor
does not suffer the full costs of the society in case of security failure. Instead, switching to a partial
liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator
should encourage not only the firms, but also the enterprises to invest in security. I also discuss
the effect of network externality and explain why firms engage in “vaporware”.
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Chapter I
Switching Costs in Two-sided Markets
This paper studies a dynamic two-sided market in which consumers face switching costs
between competing products. I first show that, in a symmetric equilibrium, switching
costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong. By contrast,
switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities
are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Second, an increase in
switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Finally,
consumer heterogeneity such as the presence of more loyal and naive customers on one
side intensifies first-period competition on this side but softens first-period competition
on the other side.
Keywords: switching costs, two-sided markets, network externality, naivety, loyalty
JEL Classification: D4, L1
“High price [and] lack of consumption apps... doomed the Surface. They
could have broken through by pricing the Surface aggressively to drive sales
volume that created a pull on app developers. But they didn’t. Consumers
stayed away.”
Hal Berenson, President of True Mountain Group, LLC.1
1 Introduction
In many markets, there are switching costs and network effects. Previous work points out
that large switching costs cause firms to charge a higher price to their locked-in customers, and
I thank Marc Bourreau, Giacomo Calzolari, Jacques Cre´mer, Vincenzo Denicolo`, Lapo Filistrucchi, Bruno
Jullien, Alireza Naghavi, Andrew Rhodes, Paul Seabright, and participants in numerous conferences and seminars
for helpful comments. Any opinions expressed are those of the author only.
1Quoted from “Will Microsoft get the new Surface(s) right? Part 1,” hal2020.com, May 8, 2014.
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large network externalities cause platforms to charge a lower price, yet little is known about
the interaction between the two concepts. This paper studies how switching costs affect price
competition when network externality is present; I find that an increase in switching costs of one
group intensifies price competition for the other group in the introductory period.
A good example is the smartphone operating system market. Apple, Google and Windows are
key players in the market. Each of them faces two groups of consumers, application users and
application developers. While it is easy for consumers to migrate data from an older version of
Windows Phone to a newer version, a consumer who switches from Android to Windows Phone
incurs the cost of migrating—if not re-purchasing—a set of apps, media files, as well as contacts,
calendars, emails and messages. As suggested by Hal Berenson, one of the problems faced by
Windows Phone is its weak app library. Suppose now that Windows improves its library by intro-
ducing more Android apps. This not only raises the utility of users through network externality
but also lowers their switching cost in terms of data migration. For instance, making some An-
droid movie or music streaming apps available also for Windows Phone allows users to migrate
their media files across devices more easily without the hassle of moving the data manually, which
results in lower switching costs.2 Such change may seem to be welfare-improving because the ex-
tent to which platforms can exploit their locked-in customers is smaller. However, in markets with
cross-group externalities, where participation of one group increases the value of participating for
the other group, I show that a decrease in switching costs of the user leads to an increase in the
price for developers. Since developers value the participation of the user and a decrease in switch-
ing costs of the user makes attracting users easier, the platform can price higher to extract rents
from developers. As a consequence, lower switching costs may not improve consumer welfare. It
is important that regulators can evaluate the outcome of these cross-group effects properly. The
analysis also provides insight into other two-sided markets with switching costs, such as media,
credit cards, video games, and search engines.
I consider a simple Hotelling model of duopoly with horizontal differentiation, where platforms
0 and 1 sell their product to consumers whose relative preference for the two platforms are indexed
by their position along a unit interval. Consumers have unitary demand, so that in each period,
each consumer purchases one good from either platform (single-homing). The penultimate section
will extend the analysis to cover the multi-homing case. I assume that there are both switching
costs and network externalities. Moreover, consumers are heterogeneous in terms of loyalty and
naivety. Loyal consumers are attached to one platform and never switch.3 Naive consumers are
short-sighted and care only about today. This model is flexible enough that it can collapse to
either a pure switching-cost model or to a pure two-sided market model for extreme parameter
2Klemperer (1995) gives many examples of different kinds of switching costs, for instance, learning costs, psy-
chological costs, transactions costs, etc. The UK Office of Fair Trading documented some useful case studies.
3A survey published by Consumer Intelligence Research Partners (CIRP) reveals that almost half of smartphone
buyers stay loyal to their previous brand, with Apple having the highest loyalty rate. This survey was taken from
data surveying 500 subjects in the US who had purchased a new mobile phone in the previous 90 days over the
last four quarters, between July 2012 and June 2013.
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values. When both effects are at work, I show that conventional results may change. I focus on
symmetric equilibrium in which platforms charge the same price to each side. I also show that
such equilibrium exists even when parameters on the two sides are not symmetric.
This paper’s contribution is twofold. First, it studies switching costs together with network
externalities, whereas the existing literature has tended to focus on either of them. Discussing
the two together is important—I show that switching costs work differently in a two-sided mar-
ket and this result has important implications for consumer protection. In a one-sided market,
switching costs may intensify or soften first-period price competition depending upon how patient
consumers are relative to platforms; but in a two-sided market, under strong externalities, higher
switching costs always make the first-period more competitive. I also find that there is a cross-
effect: higher switching costs on one side unambiguously reduce the price on the other side. The
second contribution relates to the investigation of consumer heterogeneity that has been neglected
in the two-sided market literature. In particular, this model provides a general framework for
examining how switching costs affect the pricing strategy of platforms depending on consumers’
characteristics, such as sophistication and loyalty, which traditional arguments cannot deal with.
The main results can be summarized as follows. When cross-group externalities are weak,
whether higher switching costs make the market more competitive in the first period depends on
two forces. On the one hand, more patient consumers are less tempted by a temporary price cut
because they understand that the price cut will be followed by a price rise in later periods. Their
demand is therefore less elastic, and platforms will respond by charging higher prices. On the
other hand, more patient platforms put more weight on future profits, and thus both compete
aggressively for market share. Switching costs make markets more competitive if platforms are
relatively more patient than the consumers. By contrast, when externalities become sufficiently
strong, platforms’ incentive to lock consumers in becomes stronger because by capturing one group
of consumers, it helps to convince the other group to join. Consequently, higher switching costs
cause the platform to charge a lower price in the first period. Additionally, there is a cross-group
effect: an increase in switching costs on one side unambiguously decreases the price on the other
side. The reason is that platforms can build market share either directly through one side or
indirectly through the other side. When switching costs on one side are large, an easier way to
build market share is to focus on the indirect channel; consequently first-period competition is
increased on the other side (Proposition 5).
Considering consumer heterogeneity, I show that platforms offer lower prices to one side if
there are many naive and loyal consumers. The intuitive reason is that after consumers make
their purchase in the first period, consumers who are loyal know that they will patronize the same
platform for an indefinite period of time, and feel that they deserve a bigger carrot in the first
period. The presence of naive consumers, who care only about immediate cost and reward, gives
even more incentive to platforms to compete aggressively. Platforms charge higher prices to one
side if on the other side there are more naive consumers. This is because higher price elasticity on
the side with more naive consumers reduces the opportunity cost of recruiting consumers on the
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other side. Therefore, it leads to less competitive behavior on the other side (Proposition 7).
These results yield clear policy recommendations. First, since asymmetric price structures are
common in two-sided markets, attractive introductory offers do not necessarily call for consumer
protection as in one-sided markets. Second, if disloyal consumers do not know their preferences
in the first period, platforms may provide imprecise information about their tastes, so that these
consumers are less loyal, and they will switch more, which platforms can exploit later. Therefore,
there is room for government intervention, particularly in achieving a greater transparency of
information. Disloyal consumers would benefit from more information, so that they are able to
make choices that are best aligned to their tastes. As a result, they can build loyalty more easily
and save considerable switching costs.
1.1 Related Literature
There is a sizeable literature on switching cost, which broadly speaking, can be categorized
into two main groups.4 One group of papers assumes that firms cannot discriminate between old
and new consumers. Firms knowing that they can exercise market power in the second period over
those consumers who are locked-in, they are willing to charge a lower price in the first period in
order to acquire these valuable customers. This “bargains-then-ripoff” pattern is the main result
of the first-generation switching-cost models (see for instance Klemperer (1987a, b)). A second
group of works allows for price discrimination, so firms can charge a price to its old customers
and a different price to new ones. Chen (1997) analyzes a two-period duopoly with homogeneous
goods. Under duopoly, consumers who leave their current supplier have only one firm to switch
to. Since there is no competition for switchers, this allows the duopolist to earn positive profits in
equilibrium. Taylor (2003) extends Chen’s model to many periods and many firms. With three or
more firms, there are at least two firms vying for switchers, and if products are undifferentiated,
these firms will compete away all their future profits. More recent contributions include Biglaiser,
Cre´mer and Dobos (2013), which studies the consequence of heterogeneity of switching costs in
an infinite horizon model with free entry. They show that even low switching cost customers are
valuable for the incumbent.
The design of pricing strategies to induce agents on both sides to participate has occupied a
central place in the research on two-sided markets.5 The pioneering work is Caillaud and Jullien
(2003), who analyze a model of imperfect price competition between undifferentiated intermedi-
aries. In the case where all agents must single-home, the only equilibrium involves one platform
attracting all agents and the platform making zero profit. In contrast, when agents can multi-
home, the pricing strategy is of a “divide-and-conquer” nature: the single-homing side is subsidized
(divide), while the multi-homing side has all its surplus extracted (conquer). Armstrong (2006)
4Farrell and Klemperer (2007), and Klemperer (1995) provide excellent overviews on the literature of consumer
switching costs.
5See Rysman (2009) for a survey of the literature on two-sided markets.
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advances the analysis by putting forward a model of competition between differentiated platforms
by using the Hotelling specification. He finds that the equilibrium price is determined by the mag-
nitude of cross-group externalities and whether agents single-home or multi-home. His approach is
the closest to mine. However, he focuses on a static model of two-sided market without switching
costs, while here with switching costs and different degrees of sophistication the problem becomes
a dynamic one. Another closely related paper is Rochet and Tirole (2006), who combine usage and
membership externalities (as opposed to the pure-usage-externality model of Rochet and Tirole
(2003), and the pure-membership-externality model of Armstrong (2006)), and derive the optimal
pricing formula. But they focus on the analysis of a monopoly platform.
Substantial studies have been separately conducted in the dual areas of switching costs and
two-sided markets, but analysis is rarely approached from a unified perspective. This paper seeks
to fill the gap. Besides this study, there is little literature that studies the interaction between
switching-costs and network externalities. Su and Zeng (2008) analyze a two-period model of
two-sided competing platforms. Their focus is on the optimal pricing strategy when only one
group of agents has switching costs and their preferences are independent, while this paper studies
a richer setting in which both sides bear switching costs, and consumers are heterogeneous in
terms of loyalty and naivety. Therefore, one can view Su and Zeng (2008) as a special case of my
model. Biglaiser and Cre´mer (2014) study the effect of switching costs and network externalities
on competition, but they do not address the issue in a two-sided context.
2 Model
Consider a two-sided market with two periods. There are two groups of consumers, denoted
A and B, such as smartphone users and application developers. Assume that for some exogenous
reasons in each period consumers choose to single-home. Section 5.1 will extend the analysis
to cover the multi-homing case. Both sides of consumers have switching costs: side i (A or B)
consumers have to incur switching cost si ≥ 0 if they switch platform in the second period. On each
side, consumers are heterogeneous in two dimensions. First, consumers can be naive or rational.
Naive consumers, who are a fraction αi of the population on side i, make decisions based on their
first-period utility; while rational consumers, who form a fraction 1 − αi of side i’s population,
make decisions based on their lifetime utility. Therefore, on each side, naive consumers have
δi = 0, while rational consumers have δi > 0.
6 Moreover, I distinguish the firm’s discount factor,
denoted δF , from the consumer’s discount factor δi. Second, consumers learn whether they are
loyal or not after their purchase in the first period. With probability µi consumers’ preferences
do not change and they never switch (“loyal”), and with probability 1 − µi their preferences are
6This is different from Klemperer (1987b) because he does not consider the possibility of having a mixture of
naive and rational consumers. Consumers are either all naive or all rational.
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re-distributed on the unit interval in the second period (independent preferences).7 Independent
preferences are needed for technical reason because it smooths the demand function. Since not all
consumers have changing preferences in practice, I assume that there are some loyal consumers.
There are two competing platforms, denoted 0 and 1, which enable the two groups to interact.
Consider a simple Hotelling model, where consumers on each side are assumed to be uniformly
located along a unit interval with the two platforms located at the two endpoints. Both αi and
µi are known by the platforms. Throughout the paper, we assume that platforms cannot price
discriminate among his previous customers and customers who have bought the rival’s product in
the previous period.
The utility of a consumer on side i is
vi + ein
j
k,t − |x− k| − pik,t,
where i, j ∈ {A,B} , i 6= j since the two sides are symmetric. vi is the intrinsic value of consumers
on side i for using either platform. Assume that vi is sufficiently large such that the market is fully
covered. ei is the benefit that consumer from side i enjoys from interacting with each agent on the
other side (for simplicity, I ignore the possibility that consumers also care about the number of
people in the same group who joins the platform). Suppose that each side is of mass 1, so that nik,t
is the number of agents from side i (A or B) who are attached to platform k (0 or 1) in period t
(1 or 2), while the number of agents from the same side in the same time period who are attached
to the other platform is denoted 1−nik,t. Thus, einjk,t is the total external benefit from interacting
with the other group. The location of the consumer is denoted x. To keep things simple, I assume
unit transport cost. Thus, |x−k| is the transport cost when the consumer purchases from platform
k. Platform charges are levied on a lump-sum basis: each agent from side i incurs a cost of pik,t
when he joins platform k at time t.
Platform k’s profit at time t is given by
pik,t = p
A
k,tn
A
k,t + p
B
k,tn
B
k,t, (1)
which is the sum of revenues from side-A and side-B. I make three assumptions. First, assume
that the marginal cost of production is equal to zero for simplicity. Second, assume that si ∈ [0, 1),
where one is the unit transport cost, so that at least some consumers will switch. Third, assume
ei ∈ [0, 1) in order to ensure that the profit function is well-defined, and the demand is decreasing
7Loyalty in this model can be interpreted in two ways: First, it can be interpreted as exogenous. Loyal consumers
are not able to switch because they have large switching costs. Second, loyalty can be interpreted as endogenous.
Suppose that switching cost is drawn from a two-point distribution: s is small with probability 1− µ, and s is big
with probability µ. In this case, the concept of loyalty is endogenized because it is determined by switching costs.
Both interpretations lead to the same calculations, but for simplicity I adopt the first interpretation for the rest of
the analysis.
Klemperer (1987b) makes a similar assumption, but he assumes that those consumers, who have fixed tastes,
respond to prices in both periods.
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in a platform’s own price and increasing in its rival’s price.8
The timing of the game is as follows.
• In the first period, consumers are unattached. They learn their preferences. Platforms set
the first-period price. Consumers choose which platform to join.
• In the second period, consumers learn their switching cost and whether they are loyal or
not.9 Platforms set the second-period price. Consumers decide to switch or not.
The solution concept for the game is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
2.1 Second Period: the mature market
I work backward from the second period, where each platform has already established a cus-
tomer base. Given the first-period market shares nA0,1 and n
B
0,1, a consumer on side i, located at θ
i
0
on the unit interval, purchased from platform 0 in the first period is indifferent between continuing
to buy from platform 0 and switching to platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,2 − θi0 − pi0,2 = vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θi0)− pi1,2 − si.
The indifferent consumer is given by
θi0 =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,2 − 1) + pi1,2 − pi0,2 + si].
Another consumer on side i, positioned at θi1, previously purchased from platform 1 is indifferent
between switching to platform 0 and continuing to purchase from platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,2 − θi1 − pi0,2 − si = vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θi1)− pi1,2.
The indifferent consumer is given by
θi1 =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,2 − 1) + pi1,2 − pi0,2 − si].
We then substitute θi0 and θ
i
1 into the following.
ni0,2 = µin
i
0,1 + (1− µi)ni0,1θi0 + (1− µi)(1− ni0,1)θi1. (2)
Consumers of platform 0 consists of three types, and similarly for platform 1. The first type is
loyal customers, who buy from platform 0 in both periods. The second type is switchers (whose
preferences are unrelated in the two periods), who did not switch away from platform 0. The third
type is also switchers, but they switched away from platform 1 to platform 0.
Then, we solve for the market shares, plug them into the profit functions, and solve for the
equilibrium prices. The details are shown in Appendix A.
8More specifically, one represents the unit transport cost. Assuming ei < 1 ensures that in the symmetric
equilibrium, both platforms serve some consumers.
9The analysis is the same even if consumers learn their switching cost in the first period. However, if they know
whether they are loyal or not in the first period, the calculation changes slightly, but qualitative results should
hold.
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Effect of Switching Costs on Second-period Pricing
Proposition 1. Given first-period market share, on each side, the platform with a larger market
share increases the second-period price as switching costs increase; whereas the other platform with
a smaller market share decreases the second-period price as switching costs increase.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The literature calls this price a “ripoff” because the second-period price paid by consumers in
equilibrium is higher in a market with switching costs than in a market without switching costs.10
However, the extent of the ripoff depends on market share. There are two possible strategies:
On the one hand, the platform might want to exploit its existing customers with a high price
because switching costs give platform market power over the consumers who are locked-in. On the
other hand, the platform might want to poach its rival’s customers with a low price. Proposition
1 shows that the platform with a larger market share charges a higher second-period price as
switching costs increase because it focuses more on exploiting old customers than on poaching
new customers; whereas the platform with a smaller market share charges a lower second-period
price in order to win back some customers.
Notice that if the market share is equal between platforms, then switching cost has no effect on
the second-period price, which is indeed the case when we solve the full equilibrium. The reason is
that when platforms have an equal share of the market, their incentives to exploit old customers
offset their incentives to attract new customers.
Proposition 2. Given first-period market share, the second-period price paid by consumers on
side i is increasing in switching costs of consumers on side j if
(i) Consumers on side j are more valuable (ei > ej), and platform 0 has a larger market share
on side j (nj0,1 > 1/2), or
(ii) Consumers on side i are more valuable (ei < ej), and platform 0 has a smaller market share
on side j (nj0,1 < 1/2).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 runs as follows. Part (i) shows that consumers on side j
are more valuable to the platform because they exert stronger externalities on consumers on side
i compared to externalities of side i on side j. If the platform has a larger market share of the
more valuable side, it can charge higher second-period prices to both sides compared to the case
without switching costs. That is, ∂pj0,2/∂sj > 0 from Proposition 1, and ∂p
i
0,2/∂sj > 0 from (i) of
Proposition 2.
10As will be seen later, the second-period price in my model is pi0,2 =
1−ej(1−µi)
1−µi , which is larger than the price
in a two-sided market model without switching costs, pi = 1− ej .
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By contrast, part (ii) shows that if the platform has a smaller market share of side j, according
to Proposition 1 it will focus more on poaching side j with a low price than exploiting them with
a high price, that is, ∂pj0,2/∂sj < 0. It will then charge a higher second-period price to side i
because decreasing the price on side j reduces the “opportunity cost” of recruiting consumers on
side i: the platform loses less revenue on side j by recruiting one less consumer on side i.11 Both
platforms thus compete less aggressively for them. Consequently, higher switching costs on side
j cause the platform to charge a higher price on side i, that is, ∂pi0,2/∂sj > 0. Note that what
platform 1 will do is just the opposite of platform 0 because of the asymmetric market shares.
In a one-sided market with switching costs, a platform’s market share is an important deter-
minant of its pricing strategy because it affects the platform’s future profitability (see Klemperer
(1995)); in a multi-sided market it is crucial to also take into consideration network externalities.
Relying on a one-sided logic may overestimate potential anti-competitive effects: according to
Proposition 1 the second-period price tends to increase with switching cost on the side that the
platform has a larger market share; but this does not necessarily imply anti-competitive motives in
two-sided markets, since according to Propositions 2 larger margin on one side could be translated
into smaller or even negative margin on the other side depending on the magnitude of externalities.
Effect of Switching Costs on Second-period Profit
Consider the case, where (i) the platform’s first-period market shares of the two sides are not
too small, and (ii) cross-group externalities are not too different from each other.
Proposition 3. Platform’s second-period profits are increasing in switching costs on one side if
it has a larger market share on this side than the other platform, and decreasing in switching costs
if it has a smaller market share.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In the literature, switching costs typically raise platforms’ profits in the second period of a
market with switching costs as compared to a market without switching costs because platforms
charge a higher price to repeat buyers. However, Proposition 3 shows that whether second-
period profits increase or decrease with switching costs depends on market share and cross-group
externalities.
11Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) explain that the difference between a one-side market and a two-sided market
lies in the change in this opportunity cost. In particular, the standard Lerner formula becomes
pi − (c− pj)
pi
=
1
ηi
in a two-sided market, where c is the marginal cost and η is the price elasticity.
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2.2 First Period: the new market
I now turn to the first-period equilibrium outcomes when consumers are unattached. All
consumers have discount factor δi. However, on side i, a proportion αi of consumers are naive (N)
with δi = 0. They make decisions based on their first-period utility only. A proportion 1 − αi of
side i’s population is rational (R) with δi > 0. They make decisions based on their lifetime utility.
A naive consumer on side i located at θiN is indifferent between buying from platform 0 and
platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,1 − θiN − pi0,1 = vi + ei(1− nj0,1)− (1− θiN)− pi1,1,
which can be simplified to
θiN =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1].
As for sophisticated consumers, they also take into consideration their second-period utility. If
a sophisticated consumer on side i located at θiR joins platform 0 in the first period, his expected
second-period utility is given by
U i0,2 = µi(vi + ein
j
0,2 − θiR − pi0,2) + (1− µi)
∫ θi0
0
(vi + ein
j
0,2 − θiR − pi0,2)dx
+ (1− µi)
∫ 1
θi0
(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θiR)− pi1,2 − si)dx.
U i0,2 is the sum of three terms. With probability µi the consumer is loyal and chooses to join
platform 0 in both periods; with probability (1 − µi)θi0 he has independent preferences but still
chooses to stay with platform 0; and with probability (1−µ)(1−θi0) he has independent preferences
and he switches to platform 1.
Similarly, if he joins platform 1 in the first period, his expected second-period utility is given
by
U i1,2 = µi(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θiR)− pi1,2)
+ (1− µi)
∫ 1
θi1
(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θiR)− pi1,2)dx
+ (1− µi)
∫ θi1
0
(vi + ein
j
0,2 − θiR − pi0,2 − si)dx.
A sophisticated consumer on side i is indifferent between purchasing from platform 0 and
platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,1 − θiR − pi0,1 + δiU i0,2 = vi + ei(1− nj0,1)− (1− θiR)− pi1,1 + δiU i1,2.
After some rearrangement, this gives
θiR =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1 + δi(U i0,2 − U i1,2)].
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The first-period market share of side i is
ni0,1 = αiθ
i
N + (1− αi)θiR. (3)
Then, we can derive the profit functions, and solve for the equilibrium prices. Calculations are
rather involved and interested readers can refer to Appendix B.
I focus on the platform-symmetric equilibrium: both platforms charge the same price to each
side, that is, pA0,1 = p
A
1,1 and p
B
0,1 = p
B
1,1.
Proposition 4. The single-homing model has a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Although I focus on a symmetric equilibrium, the existence of it does not require all parameters
on the two sides to be symmetric. I show the existence condition, Equations (B.1) and (B.2), in
Appendix B. In the next section, I will discuss the comparative statics of the price.
3 Discussion
The analysis of the effect of switching costs on first-period prices is complicated as several
effects are at play. An easier way to interpret the result is to start the discussion from pure
switching-cost model (a` la Klemperer) and pure two-sided market model (a` la Armstrong), and
then turn to the main model of the paper: a two-sided market model with switching costs. In
addition, I will study other interesting ingredients such as loyalty and naivety.
3.1 Pure Switching-cost Model
In a one-sided market with switching costs, all consumers are rational; network externalities
and consumers’ loyalty do not matter. Assuming that αi, µi, ei = 0, i ∈ {A,B}, the first-period
equilibrium price becomes
pi0,1 = 1 +
2
3
( δis
2
i︸︷︷︸
consumer′s anticipation
− δF si︸︷︷︸
firm′s anticipation
),
which is equivalent to Equation (18) in Klemperer (1987b).
Since the level of the first-period price is lower in a market with switching costs than without
them, the literature calls it a “bargain”. This pattern of attractive introductory offers followed
by higher prices to exploit locked-in consumers (see Proposition 1)—the “bargains-then-ripoffs”
pricing—is well-known in the switching-cost literature.
However, the extent of the bargain depends on switching costs. More specifically, the first-
period price is U-shape in switching costs. There are two effects at work: On the one hand, rational
consumers anticipate that if they are locked-in in the second period, the platform will raise its
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price. Thus, consumers are less responsive to a first-period price cut. This explains why consumers’
sophistication increases the first-period price through δi. On the other hand, forward-looking
platforms have strong incentive to invest in market share because they anticipate the benefit of
having a larger customer base in the future. Platforms thus compete more aggressively to capture
market share, and platforms’ sophistication decreases the first-period price through δF . While the
platform’s anticipation effect is first-order in switching costs, the consumer’s anticipation effect is
only second-order. Therefore, the platform’s anticipation effect dominates initially, the first-period
price decreases with switching costs; and later the consumer’s anticipation effect becomes more
powerful, and thus the first-period price increases with switching costs.12 Consequently, we get
the U-shape relationship.
3.2 Pure Two-sided Market Model
In a simple model of two-sided markets, there is only one period, so that δF , δi, αi = 0; and
loyalty and switching costs are irrelevant, so that si, µi = 0, i ∈ {A,B}.
The first-period equilibrium price is simplified to
pi = 1− ej,
which is the same as in Proposition 2 of Armstrong (2006). This equation shows that platforms
compete fiercely for the more valuable group, whose external benefit exerted on the other group
of consumers is larger.
3.3 Switching Costs in Two-sided Markets
More generally, in a two-sided market with switching costs, I find that the “bargain” can be
increasing in switching costs when externalities are strong, which is different from Klemperer’s
result. This model is a good representation of markets such as smartphone and video games.
Smartphone: switching from Apple’s iOS to Google’s Android system, application developers
need to re-code their programs for different interfaces, as well as to create additional support and
maintenance; whereas application users need to migrate and re-purchase their applications. Video
games: switching from Sony’s PlayStation to Windows’ Xbox, gamers need to re-learn how to use
the controller and lose the progress of their games, whereas developers have to buy a separate
development kit to create games for different consoles.
12Different papers use different terminologies, for example, Somaini and Einav (2013) use “anticipation effect”
and “investment incentive”, while Rhodes (2013) uses “consumer elasticity effect” and “investment effect”. I simply
call them consumer’s and firm’s anticipation effect because the mechanism goes through the discount factor. My
paper is quite different from Somaini and Einav (2013) and Rhodes (2013): they examine the effect of switching
costs in a dynamic setting without network externalities, while I discuss a model with both switching costs and
network externalities.
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Proposition 5. In the single-homing model, with all consumers and both platforms equally ratio-
nal, δi = δF = δ > 0 and αi = 0; independent preferences, µi = 0; and symmetric externalities,
ei = e > 0, i ∈ {A,B},
i. If externalities are weak, on each side the first-period price pi0,1 is U-shape in switching costs
si.
ii. If externalities are strong, on each side the first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing in switching
costs si.
iii. The first-period price charged to side i, pi0,1, is decreasing in switching costs on side j, sj.
Proof. See Appendix C.
As in Klemperer (1987b), the first-period price is lower with switching costs than without,
which represents a bargain. This paper, however, finds that the extent of the bargain depends
not only on switching costs on one side, but also on externalities and switching costs on the other
side.
More specifically, part (i) shows that when externalities are weak, we get the result of Klem-
perer: the bargain is inverted U-shape in switching costs. For small switching costs, rational
consumers understand that they can easily switch in the second period, and are therefore more
responsive to price cut in the first period. Platforms have strong incentive to compete for mar-
ket share. Consequently, switching costs are pro-competitive when they are small. By contrast,
when switching costs are very large, rational consumers recognize that they will be exploited in
the second period, and are therefore less tempted by a price cut. Their demand becomes less
elastic, and platforms will respond by charging higher prices. This explains why switching costs
are anti-competitive when they are large.
Interestingly, part (ii) shows that strong externalities overturn the U-shape result: in this case
the bargain is increasing in switching costs, and the positive relationship between the first-period
price and switching costs does not arise. The intuition is that externalities provide an additional
downward push on the first-period price because recruiting one side helps to get the other side on
board. This strengthens the incentives of platforms to invest in market share, which dominates
the incentive of rational consumers to avoid being locked-in. Consequently, switching costs always
make the market more competitive when externalities are strong.
Part (iii) shows that an increase in switching costs on one side unambiguously decreases the
first-period price charged to the other side. The reason is that platforms can build market share
on side j via two channels: directly through side j, and indirectly through side i. When switching
costs on side j are large, rational consumers are less responsive to price cuts because they expect
a price rise to follow in the second period. An easier way to build market share on side j is then
to focus on the indirect channel, i.e. attracting side i. As a result, first-period competition is
increased on side i.
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Proposition 5 also provides new insights into the two-sided market literature. While Armstrong
(2006) shows that prices are decreasing in externalities, I focus on the effect of the interaction
between network externalities and switching costs on prices.
3.4 Naive Consumers
A straightforward interpretation of naive consumers is that these consumers only care about
utility in the current period. Or this could also be interpreted as the case in which consumers are
different in every period.13
Proposition 6. In the single-homing model, when all consumers are naive, δi = 0 and αi = 1;
and have independent preferences, µi = 0, i ∈ {A,B}, the first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing in
switching costs si regardless of the level of externalities.
Proof. See Appendix D
The intuition underlying this proposition is as follows. When consumers are naive, they do not
anticipate that a first-period price cut will lead to a second-period price rise, and will therefore
react more responsively to price cut in the first period. This increases the incentives of platforms
to reduce the first-period price in order to gain more market share. Since naive consumers have no
incentive to avoid being locked-in, the platform’s incentive to compete for market share dominates.
This explains the fierce price competition for naive consumers.
Strictly speaking, expectation about whether the others will switch play no role here because
µi and αi are known. In a broader sense, however, Proposition 6 can be interpreted as in line with
earlier work by von Weizsa¨cker (1984) and Borenstein, MacKie-Mason and Netz (2000). They
show that if consumers expect that a firm’s price cut is more permanent than their tastes, which
can be interpreted as consumers being naive, then switching costs tend to lower prices.
3.5 Heterogeneous Consumers
I now turn to discuss, rather than having all consumers being rational or naive, the consequence
of having heterogeneous consumers. On each side, a fraction αi of consumers are naive, while
1 − αi of them are rational; and a proportion µi consumers are loyal, while the remaining ones
have independent preferences.14
Proposition 7. In the single-homing model,
13For example, a company buys some software for their workers in the first period. Some workers leave the
company in the second period, and purchase their own software. These workers have a switching cost of learning
some new software that are different from that purchased by their company, but the company will not take into
consideration this switching cost when buying in the first period.
14Gabszewicz, Pepall and Thisse (1992) also discuss heterogeneous consumers in terms of brand loyalty, but they
consider the pricing strategy of a monopoly incumbent, who anticipates the entry of a rival in the subsequent
period, and focus on the effect of loyalty on entry.
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i. On each side, the first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing in the proportion of naive consumers
αi, if the proportion of loyal consumers, µi, is high.
ii. The first-period price on side i, pi0,1, is increasing in the proportion of naive consumers on
side j, αj.
iii. The first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing in the discount factor of the platform δF .
Proof. See Appendix E.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Part (i) shows that on each side, if there are
many loyal consumers, the first-period price is lower with naive consumers than without.15 The
reason is that after consumers make their purchase in the first period, consumers who are loyal
know that they will patronize the same platform for an indefinite period of time, and feel that
they deserve a bigger carrot in the first period. Naive consumers, who care only about today, are
more attracted by a price cut. Therefore, increasing the proportion of consumers who are loyal
and naive makes the market more competitive in the first period.
Part (ii) shows that an increase in the proportion of consumers who are naive on one side will
soften price competition on the other side. Intuitively, the demand of naive consumers on side
j is more elastic, and platforms will react by charging lower prices. This, in turn, reduces the
opportunity cost of recruiting consumers on side i. Platforms thus compete less aggressively for
market share on side i. Consequently, consumers’ naivety on one side mitigates the ferocity of
first-period competition for market share on the other side.
Part (iii) shows that first-period prices are lower when platforms are more patient. Platforms
compete harder on prices because they foresee the advantage of having a large customer base in
the future.
More generally, Propositions 5 and 7 say that the strategy of lowering price is not simply due to
network externalities in a two-sided market, a view that is central to the work of Rochet and Tirole
(2003), and Armstrong (2006). But in my model whether the platform will act more aggressively
also depends on the characteristics of consumers and their switching costs. This has important
implications on regulations that alter switching costs and loyalty rate in real circumstances, which
will be explored more fully in Section 4.
3.6 A Special Case: asymmetric sides
The model also covers the case of asymmetric sides, where consumers on one side, say side-B, do
not incur any switching costs in the second period (sB = 0). Examples of such a market include
browsers, search engines, and shopping malls. Browsers: Internet users can switch relatively
more easily between Internet Explorer, Chrome, and Firefox than content providers because when
15If consumers’ tastes change (µ < 1), it may nullify the competitive effect of naivety.
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content providers switch, they need to rewrite the codes so that they are compatible with the
new browser. Search engines: customers can switch easily between Google, Bing and Yahoo in as
little as one click, but there are switching costs for top-listed publishers, who want their website
to appear on the top list of another search engine. Shopping malls: shoppers are free to go to any
shopping malls, but there are high transaction costs for shops in terminating the old contract and
initiating a new one.
For simplicity, assume that consumer preferences are independent, µi = 0; all consumers are
rational, αi = 0; and they have the same discount factor as the firm, δi = δF = δ, i ∈ {A,B}.
Corollary 1. If only one side of consumers has switching costs, then switching costs only affect
the price on this side but not the other side.
Proof. Under the assumptions above,
pB0,1 = 1− eA.
The intuition is that since preferences of side-B consumers in the two periods are unrelated
and they do not have switching costs, every period’s choice is independent. This means that
the first-period price is not affected by the second-period price. Consequently, although side-A
consumers’ switching costs affect side-B’s second-period price through externalities, it does not
affect side-B’s first-period price.
3.7 Effect of Switching Costs on First-period Profit
In a platform-symmetric equilibrium, the two platforms share consumers on each side equally,
that is nA0,1 = n
B
0,1 = 1/2. Therefore, the expected profit of platform 0 is
pi0 =
1
2
pA0,1 +
1
2
pB0,1 + δpi0,2,
where pi0,2 is the second-period profit.
Differentiating pi0 with respect to si, we obtain
∂pi0
∂si
=
1
2
∂pi0,1
∂si
+
1
2
∂pj0,1
∂si
because the profit in the last period, pi0,2, is not affected by si in equilibrium.
As is well-known from the switching-cost literature, switching costs raise platforms’ profits in
the second period compared to the case of no switching costs as second-period prices are usually
higher. However, the presence of market power over locked-in consumers intensifies competition
in the first period, and this may result in a decrease in overall profit.16
16See for instance Klemperer (1987a).
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More interestingly, I identify an additional channel through which switching costs can reduce
overall profit, namely, when network externalities are strong. The reason is that strong externalities
increase the incentives of platforms to vie for market share, and therefore switching costs on side
i intensify price competition on side i (see (ii) of Proposition 5). Higher switching costs on side
i also lead to more competitive behavior on side j because capturing more consumers on side j
is a cheaper way to build market share on side i. Side i consumers are harder to attract as they
have strong incentives to avoid being locked-in and thus paying large switching costs in the second
period (see (iii) of Proposition 5). Higher switching costs lower prices on both sides, and thereby
reducing overall profit.
4 Welfare and Policy Implications
The first-period welfare is constant in switching costs because all consumers buy one unit of
good, the size of the two groups is fixed, and the whole market is served. It ignores the possible
demand-expansion and demand-reduction effects of switching costs as the total demand is fixed.
However, the second-period welfare is decreasing in switching costs. The welfare loss is the sum
of two deadweight losses:
2(1− µi)[ (1− si
2
)si︸ ︷︷ ︸
DWL from switchers
+
s2i
4︸︷︷︸
DWL from non−switchers
].
Consider consumers who have independent preferences. Since their tastes will change in the
second period, for those who have previously bought from platform 0, consumers whose tastes
change a lot will switch to platform 1 with probability (1 − si)/2 and each pays si; consumers
whose tastes change a little will continue to buy from platform 0 even though they prefer platform
1. This happens with probability si/2 and each suffers an average loss of mismatch with an
inferior product si/2. Similarly, consider consumers who have previously bought from platform
1. Consumers on both sides suffer this loss. As for loyal consumers, there is no loss for them
because first, they do not switch; second, their preferences do not change, and hence there is no
deadweight loss associated with mismatch.17
Although switching costs lower social welfare, from the consumer welfare point of view, con-
sumers may still benefit from switching costs if the equilibrium price is lower. I therefore suggest
the following policy implications. In one-sided markets, attractive introductory offers that induce
early adoption may call for consumer protection in later periods, for example, through compat-
ibility or standardization policies that lower switching costs. In two-sided markets, asymmetric
price structures are common because they help to increase the participation of different groups
17Naivety does not affect welfare. The only thing that matters for welfare is whether consumers’ preferences
change or not. When consumers’ preferences do not change, they make the right product choice and do not switch.
When consumers’ preferences change, switchers have to incur the switching costs, and some of the non-switchers
are forced into buying an inferior product that does not match their tastes.
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of consumers. For example, Proposition 2 shows that sj may have a positive or negative impact
on pi0,2, and Proposition 5 shows that the relationship between p
i
0,1 and si depends on e, and p
i
0,1
decreases with sj. Therefore, when policy-makers alter switching costs of one group, it may have
broader repercussions on the other group; sticking to a one-sided logic may lead to inefficient
policies.18
In this model, I assume that all consumers know their preferences in the current period, but
tastes of some consumers may change. One could alternatively interpret a fraction µi of consumers
know their preferences, while 1 − µi of them do not know theirs. Disloyal consumers receive a
signal about their tastes in the first period, and after buying from the platform, they know their
tastes in the second period. This would not change the result as long as the signal is uniformly
distributed. This allows us to evaluate the effect of information transparency policy. For example,
Proposition 7 shows that loyalty makes it more likely that naivety will hurt the platform. Thus,
platforms may lack incentive to enhance consumers’ understanding of their own preferences. They
might try to provide imprecise information about consumers’ tastes, so that consumers are less
loyal, and they will switch more, which platforms can exploit later. Therefore, there is room
for government intervention. In particular, increasing transparency of information would enable
disloyal consumers to make choices that are best aligned to their tastes, build loyalty and save
switching costs.
5 Extensions
The analysis so far is based on a single-homing model, but this is not the only market con-
figuration in reality. There are various ways to extend the model, for instance, one may consider
the case where one group single-homes while the other group join both (commonly termed as
“competitive bottlenecks”). It might also be interesting to consider asymmetric platforms. I will
sketch these extensions in turn.
5.1 Competitive Bottlenecks
Suppose that side A continues to single-home, while side B may multi-home. Competitive
bottleneck framework is typical in markets such as computer operating systems, and online air
ticket and hotel bookings. Operating systems: users use a single OS, Windows OS, Apple’s Mac
OSX platform or Linux-based OS, while engineers develop software for different OS. Travel book-
ings: consumers use one comparison site such as skyscanner.com, lastminute.com or booking.com,
but airlines and hotels join multiple platforms in order to gain access to each comparison site’s
customers. Since side B can join both platforms, switching costs and loyalty on this side are
18Wright (2004) also shows that analyzing a two-sided market as if it was a one-sided market may lead to some
policy errors. Different from him, however, this paper identifies some new issues raised by switching costs in
two-sided markets that have not been discussed previously.
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not relevant, so that sB, µB = 0.
19 The main difference from the single-homing model lies in the
market share of side-B consumers, which can be described as follows. In period t, t ∈ {1, 2}, a
side-B consumer located at θB0,t is indifferent between buying and not buying from platform 0 if
vB + eBn
A
0,t − θB0,t − pB0,t = 0,
which can be simplified to
θB0,t = vB + eBn
A
0,t − pB0,t.
Similarly, a side-B consumer located at θB1,t is indifferent between buying and not buying from
platform 1 if
vB + eB(1− nA0,t)− (1− θB1,t)− pB1,t = 0,
which can be simplified to
θB1,t = vB + eB(1− nA0,t)− pB1,t.
We solve the game by backward induction as before. Consider the symmetric equilibrium.
Appendix F proves the existence of it. We can then derive the equilibrium prices.
Proposition 8. In the multi-homing model, with all consumers and both platforms equally rational,
δi = δF = δ > 0 and αi = 0; independent preferences, µi = 0; and symmetric externalities,
ei = e > 0, i ∈ {A,B},
i. For the single-homing consumers, if externalities are weak, the first-period price pA0,1 is U-
shape in switching costs sA. If externalities are strong, the first-period price p
A
0,1 is decreasing
in sA.
ii. If the market is fully covered, then first-period prices tend to be higher on the multi-homing
side and lower on the single-homing side with respect to the single-homing model in Section
3.6.
Proof. See Appendix F.
19Note that the concept of multi-homing is not compatible with switching costs in the current framework. I use
two examples to illustrate. First, think of the smartphone market. If the option to multi-home means consumers
are able to use both iPhone and Android systems, then it is not reasonable to impose an additional learning cost
on them if they switch platform. Another example is the media market. If multi-homing means that advertisers
are free to put ads on either or both platforms, then it does not make sense to impose an additional switching
cost on these advertisers. One may argue that we can distinguish between learning switching costs (incurred only
at a switch to a new supplier) and transactional switching costs (incurred at every switch), as in Nilssen (1992),
but switching costs are not relevant on the multi-homing side because learning costs and transaction costs are
equivalent in a two-period model. This also explains why it is not useful to consider the case in which both sides
multi-home.
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Part (i) implies that for single-homing consumers stronger externalities make it more likely that
first-period equilibrium prices decrease with switching costs, which is consistent with Proposition
5 in the single-homing model. As for multi-homing consumers, both switching costs and the degree
of sophistication do not affect the price paid by them because each period’s choice is independent.
This case and the previous case of asymmetric sides have similar intuition because sB, µB = 0.
Part (ii) is different from results in the single-homing model. Since side B multi-homes, there
is no competition between the two platforms to attract this group. Compared with the case of
asymmetric sides, the higher first-period price faced by the multi-homing side is a consequence of
each platform having monopoly power over this side, and the large revenue is used in the form of
lower first-period price to convince the single-homing side to join the platform.
Before, in the single-homing model, switching costs do not affect the first-period welfare, but
lowers the second-period welfare. However, in the multi-homing model switching costs affect first-
period welfare through participation, which is, in turn, determined by the price. In the second
period, switching cost has no effect on price because platforms have an equal share of the market,
and their incentives to exploit old customers offset their incentives to poach new customers. If
switching costs reduce first-period price (see (i) of Proposition 8, especially when externalities
are strong), then switching costs may increase welfare.20 This is because lower price induces more
consumers to multi-home, and more multi-homing consumers increases the utility of single-homing
consumers.
5.2 Asymmetric Platforms
Let us now consider asymmetric platforms. The cost of switching from platform 0 to 1, denoted
s0, is different from the cost of switching from platform 1 to 0, denoted s1. As an example, some say
“iPhones are more expensive than most Samsung smartphones.”21 Can we attribute the difference
in the pricing of devices between Apple and Samsung to the fact that Apple has successfully built
an ecosystem that makes users hard to switch? To address this question, consider two groups of
consumers who are asymmetric in the sense that only consumers on side A incur switching costs
in the second period. For simplicity, assume that all consumers single-home. Consider a numerical
example where δA = δB = δF = 0.8, µA = µB = 0, eA = eB = 0.5, s1 = 0.5, and s0 ∈ [0, 1].
The results are illustrated in Figure 1. Panel (a) presents the first-period pricing, and panel
(b) shows the second-period pricing as functions of switching costs s0. Pricing of platform 0 is
shown with a solid line, and that of platform 1 is drawn as a dotted line. It is shown that if
s0 < s1, platform 1 charges a lower price than platform 0 in the first period, but a higher price
in the second period. The intuitive reason is that since platform 1 is relatively more expensive to
switch away from in the second period, it is willing to charge a lower price in the first period in
20If there is quality choice as in Anderson et al. (2013), then welfare effects are less clear-cut: platform’s
investment in quality may change depending on whether multi-homing is allowed.
21NBC News, “Apple is biggest US phone seller for first time,” 1 February 2013, by Peter Svensson. http:
//www.nbcnews.com/technology/apple-biggest-us-phone-seller-first-time-1B8210244
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Pricing with Asymmetric Platforms.
order to acquire more customers whom it can exploit later. On the contrary, if s0 > s1, platform
1, knowing that consumers will easily switch away tomorrow, will raise its price today. This result
holds as long as externalities are not too strong.22
6 Conclusion
This paper has characterized the equilibrium pricing strategy of platforms competing in two-
sided markets with switching costs. The main contribution is that it has provided a useful model for
generalizing arguments already used in the switching-cost and the two-sided market literature, and
for extending beyond traditional results. In line with earlier research, there are some conditions
under which switching costs reduce first-period prices but increase second-period prices (a` la
Klemperer); and prices tend to be lower on the side that exerts a stronger externalities (a` la
Armstrong). However, this model develops the idea further by proving that in a dynamic two-
sided market—as opposed to a merely static one—under weak externalities, switching costs soften
price competition in the first period if consumers are significantly more patient than the platforms;
under strong externalities, switching costs always make the market more competitive. In terms
of consumer heterogeneity, the presence of more loyal and naive consumers on one side intensifies
price competition in the first period on this side.
The analysis could be extended in a number of different directions. First, this paper has
taken switching costs as an exogenous feature of the market. Future research could consider
endogenous switching costs. Second, this paper has focused on a two-period model, and it would
be useful to understand the extent to which the results carry over to a multi-period model. Finally,
this paper has explored heterogeneity such as loyalty and naivety, but one can think of other
22For large externalities (e → 1), symmetric equilibrium does not exist because there is coordination problem.
Given that externalities are so strong, all consumers might want to join one platform only.
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forms of heterogeneity across consumers. For example, within-group switching costs may be
different between the technologically advanced customers and the less advanced ones. Within-
group externalities may also be different: youngsters use applications more heavily, and therefore
care more about network externalities than their older counterparts, many of whom only use their
smartphones for phone calls and text messages. However, including these forms of heterogeneity
will complicate the analysis considerably. The current model captures a lot of ingredients in reality,
yet is sufficiently tractable to allow for a complete characterization of the equilibrium. This seems
to be a reasonable first step to extend a literature that has not fully explored the implications of
consumer heterogeneity.
A Second Period Equilibrium
Solving for nA0,2 and n
B
0,2 in Equation (2) simultaneously, we obtain the second-period market
shares as follows:
ni0,2 =
γ + βi + (1− µi)(pi1,2 − pi0,2) + ei(1− µi)(1− µj)(pj1,2 − pj0,2)
2γ
,
where
γ =1− (1− µA)(1− µB)eAeB,
βi =(2n
i
0,1 − 1)(µi + (1− µi)si) + (2nj0,1 − 1)(1− µi)ei(µj + (1− µj)sj).
Because ei < 1, we have γ > 0.
Substituting the market shares into the profit function in Equation (1), and differentiating it
with respect to the prices, we obtain the following equations.
∂pi0,2
∂pi0,2
= ni0,2 −
pi0,2
2γ
(1− µi)−
pj0,2
2γ
ej(1− µi)(1− µj),
∂pi1,2
∂pi1,2
= 1− ni0,2 −
pi1,2
2γ
(1− µi)−
pj1,2
2γ
ej(1− µi)(1− µj).
Solving the system of first-order conditions, one finds the following second-period equilibrium
prices.
pi0,2 =
1− ej(1− µi)
1− µi +
ηiλi + iλj
(1− µi)∆ , (A.1)
pi1,2 =
1− ej(1− µi)
1− µi −
ηiλi + iλj
(1− µi)∆ .
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where
∆ = 9− (1− µA)(1− µB)(eA + 2eB)(eB + 2eA) > 0,
λi = (2n
i
0,1 − 1)(µi + (1− µi)si),
ηi = 3− ej(ej + 2ei)(1− µi)(1− µj) > 0,
i = (1− µi)(ei − ej).
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiate Equation (A.1) with respect to si, we have
sign
∂pi0,2
∂si
= sign(ni0,1 −
1
2
),
∂pi0,2
∂si
=− ∂p
i
1,2
∂si
.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiate Equation (A.1) with respect to sj, we have
sign
∂pi0,2
∂sj
= sign(ei − ej)(nj0,1 −
1
2
),
∂pi0,2
∂sj
=− ∂p
i
1,2
∂sj
.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The second-period profit of platform 0 is
pi0,2 = p
A
0,2n
A
0,2 + p
B
0,2n
B
0,2
=
[
1− eB(1− µA)
1− µA +
ηAλA + AλB
(1− µA)∆
] [
1
2
+
3λA + (1− µA)(eA + 2eB)λB
2∆
]
+
[
1− eA(1− µB)
1− µB +
ηBλB + BλA
(1− µB)∆
] [
1
2
+
3λB + (1− µB)(eB + 2eA)λA
2∆
]
.
The first-order conditions with respect to sA and sB are
∂pi0,2
∂si
=
∂pi0,2
∂λi
(2ni0,1 − 1)(1− µi),
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where
∂pi0,2
∂λi
=
ηi
(1− µi)∆
[
1
2
+
3λi + (1− µi)(ei + 2ej)λj
2∆
]
+
3
2∆
[
1− ej(1− µi)
1− µi +
ηiλi + iλj
(1− µi)∆
]
+
j
(1− µj)∆
[
1
2
+
3λj + (1− µj)(ej + 2ei)λi
2∆
]
+
(1− µj)(ej + 2ei)
2∆
[
1− ei(1− µj)
1− µj +
ηjλj + jλi
(1− µj)∆
]
.
Therefore,
sign
∂pi0,2
∂si
= sign(ni0,1 −
1
2
)
if
∂pi0,2
∂λi
> 0.
For ∂pi0,2/∂λi > 0, we need n
A
0,1 and n
B
0,1 not too close to zero, as well as eA and eB are not too
different.
B First Period Equilibrium
The indifferent rational consumer is given by
θiR =
1
2
+
ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1 + δi(µi + (1− µi)si) [(1−µi)(ei+2ej)λj+(3−∆)λi](1−µi)∆
2(1 + δiµi)
.
Substitute θiN and θ
i
R into Equation (3), and solve simultaneously for n
A
0,1 and n
B
0,1:
ni0,1 =
1
2
+
ei(1− κj)(pi1,1 − pi0,1) + τj(eiτi + σi)(pj1,1 − pj0,1)
2[(1− κi)(1− κj)− (eiτi + σi)(ejτj + σj)] ,
where
τi =αi +
1− αi
1 + δiµi
,
κi =
δi(µi + (1− µi)si)(3−∆)(1− αi)(µi + (1− µi)si)
(1− µi)∆(1 + δiµi) ,
σi =
δi(µi + (1− µi)si)(ei + 2ej)(1− αi)(µj + (1− µj)sj)
∆(1 + δiµi)
.
The expected profit of platform 0 is
pi0 = p
A
0,1n
A
0,1 + p
B
0,1n
B
0,1 + δFpi0,2.
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The first-order conditions for maximizing pi0 with respect to p
A
0,1 and p
B
0,1 are given as follows.
∂pi0
∂pi0,1
= ni0,1 − pi0,1
τi(1− κj)
2ϕ
− pj0,1
τi(ejτj + σj)
2ϕ
+ δF
[
∂pi0,2
∂ni0,1
∂ni0,1
∂pi0,1
+
∂pi0,2
∂nj0,1
∂nj0,1
∂pi0,1
]
where
ϕ =(1− κi)(1− κj)− (eiτi + σi)(ejτj + σj),
∂pi0,2
∂ni0,1
=
[
6
(1− µi)∆ +
(ei − ej)− (ei + ej)(ej + 2ei)(1− µj)
∆
]
(µi + (1− µi)si) def= ξi.
Similarly, there are two first-order conditions for platform 1.
I focus on the platform-symmetric equilibrium, where pA0,1 = p
A
1,1 = p
A and pB0,1 = p
B
1,1 = p
B. I
derive the sufficient condition for the existence of such symmetric equilibrium, which requires that
platform k’s profit is concave in its prices. The concavity condition is as follows.
1− κA > eAτA + σA > 0; 1− κB > eBτB + σB > 0. (B.1)
In addition to Equation (B.1), to ensure that the platform does not deviate from the equilibrium
price, we need the following condition:
vi +
1
2
ei − 1
2
>
1
1− µi − ei > (vi +
1
2
ei − 1
2
)µi, i ∈ {A,B} . (B.2)
The first inequality means that we need vi to be big enough such that the market is covered. The
second inequality means that we need µi to be small enough and vi to be big, but not too big, in
order to guarantee that the platform does not deviate to serve only loyal consumers in the second
period. For example, Equations (B.1) and (B.2) are satisfied when αi is big and/or µi = 0 is
small.23
Under symmetric equilibrium, the first-period equilibrium prices for side A and side B are
given respectively by
pA0,1 =
1− κA
τA
− σB
τB
− eB − δF ξA; pB0,1 =
1− κB
τB
− σA
τA
− eA − δF ξB, (B.3)
and the second-period equilibrium prices are given by
pA0,2 =
1− eB(1− µA)
1− µA ; p
B
0,2 =
1− eA(1− µB)
1− µB .
C Proof of Proposition 5
If δA = δB = δF = δ > 0, αA = αB = 0, µA = µB = 0, and eA = eB = e > 0, Equation (B.3)
becomes
pi0,1 = 1− e+
δ
3(1− e2)
[
(2− 3e2)s2i − 2(1− e2)si − esisj
]
.
23When αi = 1, we obtain the same existence condition for a symmetric equilibrium as in Armstrong (2006). I
show that the equilibrium exists for a wider range of parameters.
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Differentiating pi0,1 with respect to si, we obtain
∂pi0,1
∂si
=
δ
3(1− e2)
[
2(2− 3e2)si − 2(1− e2)− esj
]
,
∂2pi0,1
∂s2i
=
2δ(2− 3e2)
3(1− e2)
{
> 0 if e <
√
2/3,
< 0 if e ≥√2/3,
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=0 =
δ
3(1− e2)
[−2(1− e2)− esj] < 0.
Therefore, pi0,1 is U-shape in si if e <
√
2/3, and decreasing in si if e ≥
√
2/3.
Differentiating pi0,1 with respect to sj, we get
∂pi0,1
∂sj
= − δesi
3(1− e2) < 0.
Therefore, pi0,1 is decreasing in sj.
D Proof of Proposition 6
If δA = δB = 0, αA = αB = 1, and µA = µB = 0, Equation (B.3) becomes
pi0,1 = 1− δF
[
6 + ei − ej − (ei + ej)(ej + 2ei)
∆
]
si − ej.
Differentiating it with respect to si, we obtain
∂pi0,1
∂si
< 0.
E Proof of Proposition 7
Differentiating Equation (B.3) with respect to αA, αB and δF , we obtain the following:
∂pi0,1
∂αi
{
≤ 0, if µi → 1 or ei, ej → 0,
> 0, if µi → 0 and ei, ej → 1,
since
∂pi0,1
∂αi
> 0 if
µi + 2µi(1− µi)si + (1− µi)2s2i
µ2i + 3µi(1− µi)si + (1− µi)2s2i
>
∆
3
.
∂pi0,1
∂αj
≥ 0.
∂pi0,1
∂δF
= −ξi ≤ 0.
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F Proof of Proposition 8
The first-order conditions of pik, k ∈ {0, 1}, with respect to pA0,1 and pB0,1 are, respectively,
nAk,1 −
1
2ω
pAk,1 −
e
2ω
pBk,1 −
δ
2ω
∂pik,2
∂nA0,1
= 0,
nBk,1 − (1 +
e2
2ω
)pBk,1 −
e
2ω
pAk,1 −
δe
2ω
∂pik,2
∂nA0,1
= 0,
where
ω = 1− e2 − δs
2
A(e
2 − 2γ)
3γ
.
Using similar proof as in the single-homing model, the symmetric equilibrium exists in the multi-
homing model. The existence conditions are as follows. First, platform k’s profit is concave in its
prices if ω ≥ 0, which means that δ, sA and e are not too big.
Second, we need to ensure that the platform does not deviate to sell only to loyal consumers
on side A.
vA + e(
vB
2
+
e
2
)− 1
2
> 1− (1− µA)e2 − evB
2
>
[
vA + e(
vB
2
+
e
2
)− 1
2
]
µA,
or equivalently, µA is small, and vB is big, but not too big.
The first-period equilibrium prices are as follows.
pA0,1 =1− e2 −
δ(3e2 − 2)s2A
3(1− e2) −
2δsA
3
− vBe
2
,
pB0,1 =
vB
2
.
For part (i), differentiate pA0,1 with respect to sA.
∂pA0,1
∂sA
= −2δ
3
− 2δ(3e
2 − 2)sA
3(1− e2) ,
∂2pA0,1
∂s2A
= −2δ(3e
2 − 2)
3(1− e2)
{
> 0 if e <
√
2/3,
< 0 if e ≥√2/3,
∂pA0,1
∂sA
|sA=0 = −
2δ
3
< 0.
Therefore, pA0,1 is U-shape in sA if e <
√
2/3, and decreasing in sA if e ≥
√
2/3.
For part (ii), we compare the first-period prices paid by consumers who bear switching costs
(side-A) and those who do not (side-B) in the multi-homing model (denoted mh) with that in the
single-homing model in Section 3.6 (denoted sh).
For side-A,
pAmh < p
A
sh if e+
vB
2
> 1.
For side-B,
pBmh > p
B
sh if e+
vB
2
> 1.
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Chapter II
Competition in the Market for Flexible
Resources: an application to cloud
computing
This paper considers firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when
demand is uncertain and correlated. Before demand is realized, two firms decide to
invest in their local capacity. Provider(s) of flexible resource observe these decisions
and invest in their capacity. After demand is realized, firms buy flexible resource
if demand exceeds their local capacity. I find that market power of the monopolist
providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates
them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the
cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap,
the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the
relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis
also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing.
Keywords: capacity investment, cloud computing, competition, demand correlation
JEL Classification: D4, L8
1 Introduction
For firms in various industries, capacity investment decision involves investing early in their
own capacity before demand for their products is realized, and such investment is difficult to
I thank Giacomo Calzolari, Jacques Cre´mer, Vincenzo Denicolo`, Florian Englmaier, Federico Etro, Neil Gandal,
Michael Katz, Thomas-Olivier Le´autier, Fabio Manenti, Paul Seabright, Tommaso Valletti, and participants in
numerous conferences for helpful comments. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Cloud
Computing: Investment, Competition and Demand Correlation.” Any opinions expressed are those of the author
only.
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reverse. After the demand is realized, firms have the option to undertake a second investment
in a flexible resource to accommodate the excess demand, for instance by outsourcing. In the
IT sector, cloud computing provides such an opportunity for outsourcing. Cloud computing is
fundamentally the leasing of computer services, including computing power and storage, but on
an unprecedented scale. While local computing capacity can support the average demand of the
firm, cloud computing is able to scale services on demand and accommodate the workload that
exceeds what the local capacity can handle.1 Accordingly, firms can use cloud computing as a
flexible resource for business continuity and disaster recovery plans.2
Moreover, in the cloud computing market, computing demand is uncertain as demand varies
daily; and correlated at a global level. For example, a U.S. cloud provider such as Amazon, Google
and Microsoft could have customers from Europe as well as Australia. Correlation is therefore
driven to some extent by geography: computing demands from countries that are close to each
other are positively correlated; demands from countries that are located in different time zones
are negatively correlated. Moreover, as argued by Harms and Yamartino (2010), even the largest
cloud provider will not be able to eliminate uncertainty and correlation.3
This paper focuses on the problem of capacity investment in two resources when demand is
uncertain and correlated. In the cloud computing example, capacity is a key part of competition in
this industry. In the introductory phase, it is common that cloud providers build far more capacity
than needed, and one does not expect capacity to be an issue in this growing phase. However,
as cloud computing enters a more mature phase, capacity may become constrained as demand
grows quickly.45 For example, on August 25, 2013, Amazon seems to struggle to keep up with the
growing computing demand, and an IT problem at one of its datacenters has caused many users of
major web services such as Instagram, Netflix, Vine and Airbnb to experience lengthy delays and
reduced data transfer speeds for several hours.6 Amazon’s web stores, Microsoft’s outlook.com,
Google’s Gmail email service and the YouTube video site have also faced similar glitches from time
to time. This raises a number of interesting questions: what is the profit-maximizing investment
1The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology provides five defining characteristics of cloud com-
puting: on-demand service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service. This
paper focuses on the definition of on-demand service and rapid elasticity.
2Business continuity and disaster recovery plans minimize any disruption of business operation due to insufficient
local capacity or failure of critical systems.
3In the cloud computing market, retailers increase computing demand during the holiday season; and businesses
need more computing power during the tax season. However, this type of correlation is not correlation across firms,
and is therefore not the focus of this paper.
4International Data Corporation (IDC) estimates that worldwide spending on public cloud services is expected
to reach $47.4 billion in 2013 and $107 billion in 2017, which represents a growth rate five times that of the IT
industry as a whole.
5Capacity can be interpreted in two ways: number of physical servers or service quality. In the former case,
there is a maximum traffic that each server can handle. In the latter case, even if the capacity does not hit the
limit, high demands can put a costly strain on servers, which results in poor quality of service.
6BBC news, “Instagram, Vine and Netflix hit by Amazon glitch,” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-23839901, August 26, 2013 (accessed on August 27, 2013).
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strategy in flexible resource such that the problem of quality degradation can be avoided? How
should we promote efficient investment from a public policy perspective?
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, I consider investment in two resources: firms
first invest in their local capacity, and later can use flexible resources as an alternative sourcing
option to cover temporary shortage of local resources; Second, I focus on uncertain and correlated
demand; whereas the existing literature either assumes one type of resources or ignores demand
correlation. An interesting finding is that investment can increase with correlation, which is in
contrast to the common belief that only negative correlations are valuable because the provider
can aggregate demand and reduces the risk.7 The reason why providers invest more as correlation
increases is that when capacity is cheap, providers can benefit more from high demand realizations
without worrying about the risk of low demand realizations.
Two firms, whose demand is uncertain and correlated, make their investment decision in lo-
cal resource under demand uncertainty. Observing firms’ local investment, providers of flexible
resource (e.g. Amazon, Google and Microsoft) decide how much to invest in capacity, and set
the price for their flexible resource (e.g. Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Compute Engine,
Microsoft Azure). After demand is realized, firms can buy flexible resources if demand exceeds
their local capacity.
I consider both cases of monopoly and duopoly in providing the flexible resource. As should
be expected, investment is suboptimal in the monopoly market. Particularly, the provider of
the flexible resource tends to underinvest in its capacity with respect to the socially optimal level,
whereas firms tend to overinvest in their local capacity. Such inefficiency comes from market power
of the monopolist. Firms invest in local capacity to avoid being exploited by the monopolist, which
in turn reduces investment incentive of the monopolist.
Competition always mitigates the underinvestment problem, but more interestingly, the extent
of improvement depends crucially on demand correlation and the cost of capacity. Both socially
optimal and monopoly investment in flexible resource increases with correlation if the investment
cost of flexible resource is small enough, and decreases with correlation if the flexible resource is
costly. The reason is that as correlation increases, firms either “win big” when demand realization
is high for both firms or “lose big” when demand realizations is low for both firms. If the flexible
resource is cheap, the planner or the provider need not worry about “losing”. Rather, they
will focus on reaping benefits from the “winning” outcome, and therefore they invest more as
correlation increases. On the contrary, if the flexible resource is expensive, then “losing” is costly,
and thus they invest less as correlation increases.
Under duopoly, I show that investment in flexible resource is increasing in correlation for
high or low correlations with a numerical example. The reason for not observing the negative
relationship between investment and correlation in this case, as opposed to the social optimum
and the monopoly case, is that firms rely more on the flexible resource as competition between
providers lowers the price of flexible resources. Firms’ incentive to capture the windfall from the
7See, for instance, p. 218 of Bayrak et al. (2011).
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“winning” high demand realizations increasingly outweighs their incentive to avoid the risk of
“losing” as correlation increases. Knowing this, each provider is willing to build a bigger capacity
of flexible resources. These results suggest that information on the cost condition and the degree
of demand correlation have important consequences for investment. They also explain the need
for far more data on costs and demand in order to underpin the appropriate degree of competition
in an industry. I will discuss in more detail the implications of competition on investment in the
cloud computing industry in the penultimate section.
1.1 Literature
This paper is closely related to the literature on capacity and resource flexibility in operational
management. However, unlike this paper, this literature either studies monopolistic models that
cannot explain the effect of competition or studies a competitive setting without demand corre-
lation. For example, Lee (2009) studies the optimal capacity investment of a computing service
provider in a single resource in the absence of correlated demands. Niyato, Chaisiri and Lee (2009)
study the optimal choice of private and public computing service in the monopoly and oligopoly
market, but again in a context without correlated demands. Both Van Miegham (1998), and Bish
and Wang (2004) study the optimal investment strategy in flexible resources when a monopolist
faces uncertain demands for its two products, which corresponds to the social optimum in this
model. However, they did not identify the problem of suboptimal investment, and more impor-
tantly, how to correct the problem. There are few papers that study firms’ choice of technology
in a competitive setting. See, for instance, Goyal and Netessine (2007) and Anupindi and Jiang
(2008). However, these papers focus on the production stage, without taking into account the
incentives to provide flexible resource.
This paper is also related to the literature on Real Options (RO) in finance, which focuses on
the role of RO in providing flexibility to management decisions. However, unlike financial assets,
IT investments are not tradable, and therefore cannot be priced at the value of risk; rather they
are priced by a third party, which is the service provider in this case. See, for instance, Angelou
and Economides (2005), Benaroch and Kauffman (1999) and Kauffman et. al. (2002) for details
on the limitation of RO’s applicability in IT investments. Moreover, the RO literature usually
assumes that the value of investment projects is uncorrelated, whereas demand correlation plays
an important role here.
2 The Model
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, that need to build capacity in order to serve their customers. To
do this, they can either invest in their own local resource L or they can buy flexible resources K
from the market. The difference lies in that investments in local resources are irreversible and
these resources are for the exclusive use of the investing firm, while flexible resources can be bought
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from the market instantly when needed and released when not needed. An example of flexible
resources is cloud computing as cloud computing power is provisioned as an on-demand service.
The firm gets a profit pi for each consumer served.
Investment technology. The unit cost of local resource and flexible resource are denoted by cL
and cK respectively. I assume that local resource is supplied competitively, so that firms can buy
L at a price cL. The flexible resource market can be either a monopoly or a duopoly.
Demand. The demand for the final services of the two firms is uncertain and correlated. More
specifically, demands for firm 1 and 2, denoted by x and y respectively, are drawn from a joint
distribution h(x, y), with support [0,∞)×[0,∞). The demand of firm 1, x, is given by the marginal
distribution f(x) =
∫∞
0
h(x, y)dy. Similarly, the demand of firm 2, y, is given by g(y). In the
following analysis, I focus on the case where demands (x, y) follow an exponential distribution with
λ = 1,8 but in Appendix E I show that the main results carry through in the linear case. More
particularly, the exponential distribution can be described as follows. The marginal distributions
F (x) and G(y) and marginal densities f(x) and g(y) are respectively
F (x) =1− e−x,
G(y) =1− e−y,
f(x) =e−x,
g(y) =e−y.
The joint distribution function H(x, y) and joint density function h(x, y) follow Gumbel (1960):
H(x, y) =(1− e−x)(1− e−y)(1 + αe−x−y),
h(x, y) =e−x−y[1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)],
where −1 < α < 1 is a measure of correlation.9
We consider the following game:1011
• Stage 1: firm 1 and 2 invest in their own local capacity L1 and L2 simultaneously;
• Stage 2: the provider(s) invest(s) in capacity of flexible resources K;
• Stage 3: the provider(s) set(s) a per unit price of flexible resource p;
• Stage 4: demands (x, y) are realized and firms decides whether and how much to buy the
flexible resource.
8A distribution is exponential when F (λ, x) = 1− λe−λx is satisfied.
9Strictly speaking, ρ = cov(x,y)√
var(x)var(y)
is the coefficient of correlation, but since α and ρ move in the same
direction (more precisely, ρ = α4 , see Equation (3.10) on p. 706 of Gumbel (1960)), there is no loss of generality in
saying that α is a measure of correlation.
10I do not model entry here, but I expect the same qualitative result with entry. Although entry will lower the
price, the underinvestment problem still exists as long as p > cK .
11Section 6.1 considers alternative timing.
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It is clear that in Stage 4, if a firm’s demand spikes above its local capacity, it will purchase flexible
resources as long as the price is less than pi. In other words, a firm’s demand for flexible resources
is price-inelastic.12
For simplicity, I make the following assumptions. First, pi > cL, so there is incentive to purchase
local resources. Second, I focus on the more interesting case where cK < cL. For example, it is
common in practice that cloud computing exhibits significant economies of scale. To facilitate
our analysis, I focus on the specification with pi = 1, cL = 0.5 and cK ∈ [0, 0.5].13 Third, when
users are indifferent between buying and not buying the flexible resource, it will always buy for
some exogenous reasons such as reputation: if its customer’s demand is not served, the customer
will never purchase from that firm again. The solution concept adopted here is subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE).
3 Social Optimum
The benevolent planner chooses L1, L2, K so as to maximize social welfare. Figure 1 illustrates
the basic structure of the demand for flexible resources.
y
x
L1 L1+K
L2
L2+K
Area Demand for Cloud
I1
I1
I2
I2II
II
Ø
Ø
III
III
IV
IV
V
V
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y-L2
x+y-(L1+L2)
K
K
K
Figure 1: Demand for Flexible Resources.
In Area ∅, both firms have sufficient local capacity to serve their customers, and therefore there
is no demand for cloud. Area I1 captures the situation where firm 2’s local capacity is enough
12Qualitative results for the monopoly case would be similar if we consider elastic demand. As for the duopoly
case, however, if we consider elastic demand, we can no longer follow the approach of de Frutos and Fabra (2011),
who study a sequential capacity-price game under demand uncertainty with price-inelastic demands. Interested
reader can see Reynolds and Wilson (2000) for a discussion of the two-stage game under the assumption of
downward-sloping and uncertain demand.
13These assumptions are innocuous for two reasons. First, setting pi = 1 is only a normalization, and it will not
affect the qualitative conclusion. Second, the main results hold more generally as long as the flexible resource is
more efficient, i.e. cK < cL.
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to cover its demand, but firm 1’s demand exceeds its local capacity and will therefore purchase
flexible resources. Area I2 illustrates the reverse situation where only firm 2 buys cloud. In Area
II, both firms buy cloud. In all the cases above, all demands are served. Area III represents the
situation where firm 1 has enough local capacity, while firm 2 has too much demand such that the
flexible resource provider is capacity constrained. Area IV shows the reverse situation: firm 1 has
too much demand, while firm 2’s local capacity is sufficient. Area V captures the situation where
the demands of both firms are extremely high such that it exhausts the capacity of the flexible
resource provider. Thus the social welfare is given by
max
L1,L2,K
S =
∫
∅+I1+I2+II
(x+ y)h(x, y)dydx+
∫
III
(x+ L2 +K)h(x, y)dydx
+
∫
IV
(L1 +K + y)h(x, y)dydx+ (L1 + L2 +K)
∫
V
h(x, y)dydx
− cKK − cL(L1 + L2). (1)
Let Ω(L1, L2, K) denote the probability of (x, y) falling in areas {III} + {IV } + {V }. The
social planner only invests in flexible resources, and the socially optimal investment is given by
Ω(0, 0, K) = 1−
∫ K
0
∫ K−x
0
h(x, y)dydx = cK .
The optimal capacity is such that the social marginal benefit equals the marginal cost.
Proposition 1. The social planner only invests in the flexible resource, and the socially optimal
investment in flexible resource increases with demand correlation if cK is small, but decreases with
demand correlation if cK approaches cL.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 runs as follows. The social planner only invests in flexible
resources because cK < cL. As the demand correlation increases, so does the probability of getting
either high demand realizations or low demand realizations from both firms: the firms either “win
big” or “lose big.” The impact of an increase in demand correlation therefore depends on the cost
of the flexible resource. If the investment cost is sufficiently low, then “losing” is cheap and the
planner would focus on reaping the benefits of high demand realizations. Therefore, investment
increases with correlation for low cost. On the contrary, if investment cost is large enough, the
planner aims at minimizing the risk of “losing,” so investment decreases with correlation.
4 Monopoly
Suppose now that there is a monopoly provider for the flexible resource that chooses p and K to
maximize its expected profit. Proceeding by backward induction, given L1, L2, K and monopoly
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price pm, the demand for cloud is the same as in Figure 1 as long as pm ≤ pi. As the monopolist
can extract all the value of its cloud service, it is obvious that
pm = pi (2)
in Stage 3.
The investment of the provider is determined by
Ω(L1, L2, K) = 1−
∫ L
0
∫ L+K
0
h(x, y)dydx+
∫ L+K
L
∫ 2L+K−x
0
h(x, y)dydx = cK , (3)
In Stage 1, expecting that pm = pi, firm 1 chooses its local capacity L1 so as to maximize its
profit:
max
L1
∫ L1
0
xf(x)dx+
∫ ∞
L1
L1f(x)dx− cLL1.14
The first two terms show that the whole demand is served when demand is below local capacity,
whereas capacity is saturated when demand exceeds local capacity. The last term represents the
total spending in local capacity.
Then, the first-order condition determines the equilibrium investment of L1:
1− F (L1) ≤ cL. (4)
The second-order condition is also satisfied.
Analogously, for firm 2, the equilibrium investment of L2 is determined by
1−G(L2) ≤ cL. (5)
The market equilibrium is characterized by Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5). It is clear that,
unlike the social optimum, firms invest in a positive amount of local capacities; and unlike the
duopoly case, firms’ investments are independent of the provider’s investment strategy.
Proposition 2. In the market with a monopolistic flexible resource provider, the provider under-
invests in the flexible resource relative to the social optimum, while the firms overinvest in their
local capacity.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. The monopolist sells the flexible resource
at a monopoly price, which extracts all consumer surplus. Anticipating this, the firm will invest
in L, even if L is a less efficient technology compared with K, in order to gain part of the
consumer surplus. As a consequence, the benefit of investing in the flexible resource is lower for
the monopolist than for the social planner, and hence the monopolist underinvests.15
14The firm only gets positive profit from its local capacity because the surplus of the consumers, who are served
by utilizing the flexible resource, are extracted entirely.
15Notice that Proposition 2 holds more generally for any rationing rule. The reason is that users pay the monopoly
price, and hence the rationing rule will not affect local investment.
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To solve the problem, the regulator may ban local investments of the firms. However, this is a
rather heavy-handed approach. Firms may prefer local resources for a variety of legitimate reasons.
For instance, flexible resources are valuable for the firm as they offer the flexibility to modify a
prior investment strategy as more information becomes available over time. More particularly, in
case of “good news” the firm can scale up their services, and in case of “bad news” it can scale
down. Therefore, firms are willing to pay extra to buy the flexible resource even though it is more
expensive (pm > cL). Indeed, statistics shows that cloud computing is appealing to industries that
have high variability in data traffic such as medical research and drug discovery in the healthcare
sector.16
Therefore, I consider a lighter form of intervention. Since surplus appropriation originates
from market power, it seems reasonable to investigate whether introducing more competition in
the market—thereby forcing down the price—would incentivize the provider and the firms to
behave optimally. As we will see later, the extent to which competition improves investment
incentives is subtler than it appears as it varies with demand correlation and investment cost.
Let us now turn to the impact of correlation.
Proposition 3. In the decentralized case with a single provider, there is positive local investment;
and the monopolist’s investment in flexible resource increases with demand correlation if cK is
small, but decreases with demand correlation if cK approaches cL.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The impact of an increase in demand correlation on both socially optimal and equilibrium
investment depends on whether the flexible resource is significantly more efficient than the local
resource. The intuition of Proposition 3 is in the same spirit as Proposition 1. However, the
monopolist’s investment is more likely to be decreasing in demand correlation as shown in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. The smallest cK under which investment in flexible resource decreases with demand
correlation is larger at the social optimum than under monopoly.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that local investment is zero at the social optimum and
positive in the monopoly case. Thus, the planner will not run into the risk of not being able
to sell the flexible resource to firms that receive low demand and buy local resources only. As
a consequence, the planner can better enjoy the possible windfall from high demand realizations
than the monopolist.
16World Economic Forum (2010) identifies the healthcare industry as one of the major sectors which can benefit
from cloud computing.
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5 Duopoly
Let us now consider the case of competing providers. They play the game as before.17 I solve
the problem proceeding backwards. In the capacity-price stage, I apply some results in de Frutos
and Fabra (2011), henceforth FF, which can be summarized as follows. In their paper, two firms
make sequential capacity-price decision under demand uncertainty in markets with price-inelastic
demands. They show that
• Proposition 7 of FF. The only equilibrium in the pricing stage is a mixed-strategy equilib-
rium.
• Proposition 8 of FF. Capacity choices are asymmetric.
• Proposition 9 of FF. If the density function of demand is non-decreasing, then the equilibrium
is unique.
For a given L1 and L2, there is a stochastic demand function for the flexible resource that is
price-inelastic. Thus, we can apply FF’s results in the continuation game, where the aggregate
capacity is defined by K(L1, L2), the capacity chosen by the smaller provider k
−(L1, L2), the
capacity chosen by the larger provider k+(L1, L2), and the equilibrium expected profits of the two
providers pi−(L1, L2) and pi+(L1, L2).
The main difference between this paper and FF is that the first stage in this paper is absent
in FF. FF assume that demand is exogenously given, while here the demand for the flexible
resource is endogenously determined by investments in local capacity and the strength of demand
correlation. Therefore, unlike the monopoly case, firms’ investments are no longer independent of
the provider’s strategy. This poses several difficulties in the analysis.
First, the endogenously determined demand function for the flexible resource is not necessarily
non-decreasing, which means that the equilibrium in the continuation game may not be unique.
If this is the case, we focus on the most symmetric case, where the difference between the big firm
and the smaller firm is minimized, meaning that the degree of competitiveness is maximized.
Second, this introduces strategic interaction between the two firms: each firm’s investment
changes the demand for the flexible resource, which affects providers’ investments and in turn
affects the rival firm’s investment. To simplify the analysis, I assume that L1 and L2 are chosen
cooperatively such that L1 = L2 = L. The two firms maximize the following joint profit:
1819
max
L
[
S(L)− pi+(L)− pi−(L)]− 2cLL,
17Since there is demand uncertainty, this exercise requires more than just applying the classical result of Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983), which proves outcome equivalence between the capacity-price game and the Cournot game.
As pointed out by de Frutos and Fabra (2011), the introduction of demand uncertainty rules out the existence of
symmetric equilibria due to a difference in marginal revenue between the large firm and the small firm even if the
two firms are symmetric ex ante.
18Under this assumption, rationing rule does not affect investments in local and flexible resources.
19Even though I assume cooperative investment, the two firms act differently from the case with a single firm
because the two firms cannot share their local capacity.
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where S(L) is the social surplus given by Equation (1). The surplus is shared between the firms
and the providers (but not the consumers). This is because demand is inelastic, so firms can
extract all consumer surplus.
Solving the above problem yields the equilibrium investment in local capacity Ld1 and L
d
2, where
d denotes duopoly. Then, we can also determine the equilibrium investment in flexible resource
Kd(Ld1, L
d
2).
As should be expected, competition always increases social welfare as compared to the monopoly
case because it mitigates the underinvestment problem in flexible resources and the overinvestment
problem in local resources. A formal proof is provided in Appendix F. More interesting is that
the extent of improvement depends crucially on the cost of capacity and the degree of correlation,
which is shown in the following numerical example.20
Figure 2 plots, for a given cK , flexible resource investment against demand correlation. Social
optimum is shown with a solid line, the duopoly case is drawn as a dotted line, and the monopoly
case is illustrated by a long-dashed line.
The main observations in Figure 2 are summarized in the following remark.
Remark 1. Comparing the socially optimal, monopoly and duopoly solutions,
(i) When cK is sufficiently small, both the planner and the monopolist’s investments in flexible
resources increase with correlation. As cK approaches cL, both of these investments decrease
with correlation. The threshold level such that the impact of correlation changes is larger at
the social optimum than it is under monopoly.
(ii) Under duopoly, it can be shown that for high or low correlations, the investment in flexible
resource is increasing in correlation.
Part (i) is already shown in Propositions 1 and 3, and Corollary 1. As for part (ii), the intuitive
reason for not observing a negative relationship between investment and correlation under duopoly,
unlike the socially optimal and monopoly regimes, is as follows. Under the socially optimal and
monopoly regimes, local investment does not vary with correlation: at the social optimum local
investment is zero; in the monopoly case firms pay the monopoly price, and thus their local
investment is not affected by correlation. Unlike these regimes, in the duopoly case firms pay less
than the monopoly price and are therefore more willing to switch to buying the flexible resource
in order to capture the possible windfall of high demand realizations. As a consequence, firms
invest less in local capacities, and hence providers invest more in flexible resources as correlation
increases.
20The main difficulty in solving for an explicit solution in the duopoly case stems from the fact that the demand
for the flexible resource is endogenously determined by L and α, and this, in turn, affects the mixed strategy in
prices of the provider. Consequently, it is difficult to characterize the profit function of the firm without using a
numerical method.
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(a) cK = 0.2
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Figure 2: Flexible Resource Investment and Demand Correlation for different values of cK .
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6 Discussion
6.1 Alternative Timing
My analysis focuses on the timing where firms invest first. It fits the scenario where some
flexible resources such as cloud computing offers more flexibility in managing demand uncertainty
than local resources. However, one could alternatively consider the case where firms observe the
provider’s investment in flexible resources before deciding their own local investment. In this
setting, firms still overinvest in L, and providers still underinvest in K, provided price is chosen
after the capacity decision because the monopoly price will emerge as long as demand is inelastic.
Another alternative is to consider the case where p is chosen prior to L, but the underinvestment
problem will still occur because the provider will never charge p = cK as its profit will become
zero and it will not have any incentive to invest. Moreover, it is difficult to think of a situation in
practice that fits the scenario of choosing price prior to capacity.
6.2 Remedies
Although it is always more efficient for firms to use the flexible resource, there are two reasons
that prevent everyone from using the flexible resource only: first, the stochastic nature of demand
prevents the provider from contracting over the amount of investment ex ante; second, the provider
of the flexible resource cannot commit to marginal-cost pricing. As a consequence, firms rely more
on local capacity and the provider underinvests.
Throughout the paper, I focus on non-contingent and linear pricing.21 One can think of other
pricing structures such as non-linear tariffs and contingent pricing. First, considering non-linear
tariffs, it is common for cloud providers such as Amazon, Dropbox and Google to use non-linear
pricing for their storage service: they provide basic service for free, and then offer additional
storage capacity for a fee. However, we can easily see that non-linear pricing does not solve the
underinvestment problem because the provider will underinvest as long as p > cK .
Second, considering contingent pricing, such practice is not very popular in the market for
cloud computing: with the exception of AWS, which uses both contingent and non-contingent
pricing, other large cloud providers such as Azure, Google and IBM rarely use spot pricing. On
the contrary, in the electricity wholesale market, electricity is bought and sold at spot prices.22
Yet, there is only one kind of capacity: firms typically buy energy from electricity companies,
but do not generate their own electricity (although some firms may have their own emergency
electricity generator, they are not for regular use). As argued by Carr (2005) and Jeff Bezos in
21Non-contingent pricing means that prices are determined before demand is realized, whereas contingent pricing
are state-dependent.
22The electricity literature (see, for instance, Borenstein and Holland (2005), Murphy and Smeers (2005), Joskow
and Tirole (2007), and Le´autier (2011)) mostly considers a two-stage game, in which firms choose their capacity
first, and then they bid prices for each state of the world in a spot market. See also Crew, Fernando and Kleindorfer
(1995) for a survey of the literature on peak-load pricing.
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Stone (2013), they both envisioned today’s IT supply would transform from companies’ private
capacity into a centralized utility service, just like how electricity became a utility a century ago.
It is therefore interesting to think about how spot pricing can change investment incentives in an
environment with both flexible and local resources, as in the case of cloud computing, where firms
buy flexible resource for its instant scalability and own local resource for data security and privacy
reasons. A formal model of contingent pricing would entail a trade-off as follows: the provider
tends to price high during peak periods, which induces firms to invest more in local capacity; but
it tends to price low during off-peak periods, which induces firms to rely more on flexible resource.
Consequently, the extent to which investment is distorted depends on the relative strength of these
two effects. If, for instance, the second effect dominates, then contingent pricing can potentially
remedy the problem of underinvestment in flexible resources. Despite this additional trade-off
created by contingent pricing, investment decision still depends fundamentally on the degree of
correlation and the cost of capacity, and therefore all the main qualitative results of this paper
should remain valid.
Finally, it may be worthwhile to consider a subsidy. Suppose the regulator introduce a subsidy
s for investment in flexible resource. The cost of flexible resource becomes cK − s, so the provider
will be more willing to offer a lower price. At the same time, it also has more incentives to
undertake investment in flexible resource, which could potentially mitigate the underinvestment
problem.
6.3 Policy Implications
Cloud computing has emerged as a new business model for computing and storage resource
management for firms, and a new source of entertainment and communication services for con-
sumers. As the cloud market is still in its infancy, many classic economic issues such as pricing,
investment strategies, the appropriate market structure, competition policy, privacy and security
concerns are still unclear.23 We take the first step to understand the impact of competition on
23Recently, there has been a flurry of research on the opportunities and obstacles for the adoption of cloud
services; see, for example, Armbrust et al. (2009), Harms and Yamartino (2010), and Marston et al. (2011).
They mainly focus on three layers of the cloud architecture: infrastructure, platform, and application. However,
as argued in Bayrak et al. (2011), such categorization are useful only in defining technological differences, but
not so much in analyzing their economic impact. Indeed the existing literature on cloud computing are mostly
descriptive, and only rarely is the problem approached from a theoretical perspective. Fershtman and Gandal
(2012) raise important economic issues of cloud computing such as changes in the strength of network effects,
compatibility among software applications, the development of standards, and the market structure that should
emerge. However, most of these topics have already been well-documented in a separate literature; in order to work
on theoretical advancement, one needs to clearly delineate the unique features of the cloud computing market.
Recent efforts to expand the theoretical study of cloud computing include Wang (2014), who studies the adoption
of cloud services within a moral hazard framework, and this paper. However, they differ in two respects. First, this
paper is about capacity investment, while Wang focuses on the problem of migration, which means that there is
no investment on the provider’s side. Second, this paper studies the effect of competition, but such effect is absent
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investment in this industry.
Although there are a number of competitors in the cloud computing market such as AWS,
Azure, Google and IBM/SoftLayer, market power exists. For instance, large cloud providers
build hyperscale datacenters that exhibit significant increasing returns to scale, which could come
from the centralization of computing resources or from volume discount on the components that
providers use to build their datacenter.24 As a result, smaller firms may not be able to compete
with these incumbents. Moreover, many consumers prefer to buy service from well-known brands
because they expect higher quality. This raises concerns about the degree of competitiveness of
this market.
This model predicts that the impact of competition on investment depends crucially on the
investment cost. It is often argued that cloud computing reduces the cost of investing in computing
power significantly. While the marginal cost of producing an extra unit of storage or computing
power is close to zero, the costs of electricity for powering up the machines, cooling the systems,
as well as management, maintenance and implementation of the software and hardware in a large
server farm is far from negligible.25 Therefore, information on the cost structure in the cloud
computing industry should have been gathered and analyzed as it has important consequences for
investment.
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources. I find that
market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment, and competition
always improves social welfare. The extent of improvement depends on demand correlation and
investment cost. If investment cost is small, investment under social optimum, monopoly and
competition is increasing in correlation; if cost is large, investment under competition is still
increasing in correlation, whereas that under social optimum and monopoly goes in opposite
direction. I have also examined the potential merits of policies such as spot pricing and a subsidy
for investment in flexible resource to remedy the underinvestment problem.
These results have implications for investment decision in outsourcing, particularly in the
market for cloud computing. Admittedly, the cloud computing market is growing unpredictably,
and there is no clear indication or consensus on how it will develop. For now, this paper shows that
even if the cloud computing market follows the footsteps of the electricity market and providers
eventually adopt spot pricing, a similar trade-off that we derived here will arise. Therefore,
analyzing data on cost and demand represents a useful first step towards a fuller understanding
of the nascent industry.
in Wang.
24See Harms and Yamartino (2010) for more examples of how firms benefit from economies of scale.
25In September 2012, the New York Times reported that “the digital warehouses use about 30 billion watts of
electricity, roughly equivalent to the output of 30 nuclear power plants.”
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I list some important topics that lie beyond the scope of this paper, but would be appro-
priate for further work. The first is to consider product differentiation. For example, assuming
that cloud computing services (such as Dropbox storage services) and local storage services are
differentiated—how, then, would the investment strategy change? Second, it would be interest-
ing to study the consequences of vertical integration. For instance, what will happen if upstream
cloud computing firms such as Microsoft and Google also enter the downstream market of software
applications?
A Proof of Proposition 1
The social optimum is obtained by differentiating Equation (1) with respect to L1, L2 and K.
The F.O.C. with respect to L1 is given by
{IV }+ {V } ≤ cL.
Similarly, the F.O.C. with respect to L2 is
{III}+ {V } ≤ cL.
Finally, the F.O.C. with respect to K is:
{III}+ {IV }+ {V } ≤ cK .
As {III} + {IV } + {V } > {IV } + {V } or {III} + {V }, the marginal benefit of investing
in the flexible resource is always higher than that of local capacity. Furthermore, the marginal
cost of investing in the flexible resource is lower (cK < cL). Then we must have L
∗
1 = L
∗
2 = 0,
where asterisk denotes the socially optimal level of investment. Since cK < cL < pi, all F.O.C. are
satisfied with equality.
The socially optimal investment in the flexible resource is determined by the F.O.C. with
respect to K, which can be rewritten as
F (K,α, cK) =
∫ K
0
∫ K−x
0
h(x, y)dydx− 1 + cK = 0.
By implicit function theorem,
∂K
∂α
= −
∂F
∂α
∂F
∂K
.
We can show that
∂F
∂K
=
∫ K
0
e−K [1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2ex−K − 1)]dx
is positive. Moreover, we have
∂F
∂α
=
∫ K
0
∫ K−x
0
e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)dydx
=− e−K [K + 3e−K + 2Ke−K − 3].
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It can be shown that there exists a K¯∗ such that ∂F
∂α
< 0 when K > K¯∗, and ∂F
∂α
> 0 when
K < K¯∗. In addition, it is obvious that K decreases with cK . Therefore, if cK is small such that
K > K¯∗, then ∂K
∂α
> 0. On the contrary, if cK is large, K is small such that K < K¯
∗, then ∂K
∂α
< 0.
B Proof of Proposition 2
For firm 1, its equilibrium investment is determined by
1− F (L1) = cL,
As 1−F (L1) > {IV }+ {V }, we must have Lm1 > L∗1 = 0, and hence there is overinvestment. The
same happens for firm 2.
For the flexible resource provider, its equilibrium investment Km is determined by
max
K
Π =
∫ L1
0
∫ L2+K
L2
(y − L2)h(x, y)dydx+
∫ L1+K
L1
∫ L2
0
(x− L1)h(x, y)dydx
+
∫ L1+K
L1
∫ L1+L2+K−x
L2
(x+ y − L1 − L2)h(x, y)dydx
+K
[∫ L1
0
∫ ∞
L2+K
h(x, y)dydx+
∫ ∞
L1+K
∫ L2
0
h(x, y)dydx
+
∫ ∞
L1
∫ ∞
L2
h(x, y)dydx−
∫ L1+K
L1
∫ L1+L2+K−x
L2
h(x, y)dydx
]
− cKK.
which gives us
Ω(Lm1 , L
m
2 , K
m) = cK = Ω(0, 0, K
∗).
Suppose that the flexible resource provider invests K such that Lm+K = K∗, Since Lm > 0, it
must be Ω(Lm1 , L
m
2 , K) < Ω(0, 0, K
∗), which means such K cannot be the equilibrium. Therefore,
the flexible resource provider must invest Km such that Lm + Km < K∗, which means that
Km < K∗ (underinvestment).
C Proof of Proposition 3
The monopolist’s investment is determined by
F (K,α, cK) =
∫ L
0
∫ L+K
0
h(x, y)dydx+
∫ L+K
L
∫ 2L+K−x
0
h(x, y)dydx− 1 + cK = 0.
By implicit function theorem,
∂K
∂α
= −
∂F
∂α
∂F
∂K
.
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It is straightforward to show that
∂F
∂K
=
∫ L
0
e−x−L−K [1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2e−L−K − 1)]dx
+
∫ L
0
e−y−L−K [1 + α(2e−y − 1)(2e−L−K − 1)]dy
+
∫ L+K
L
e−2L−K [1 + α(2e−x − 1)(2e−x−2L−K − 1)]dy > 0,
∂F
∂α
=
∫ L
0
∫ L+K
0
e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)dydx
+
∫ L+K
L
∫ 2L+K−x
0
e−x−y(2e−x − 1)(2e−y − 1)dydx.
Similar to the proof in Appendix A, there exists K¯m such that ∂F
∂α
< 0 when K > K¯m; and ∂F
∂α
> 0
when K < K¯m. Moreover, as Km is decreasing in cK , then if cK is small such that K > K¯
m, then
∂K
∂α
> 0. On the contrary, if cK is such that K < K¯
m, then ∂K
∂α
< 0.
D Proof of Corollary 1
From the proof in Appendices A and C, it suffices to show ∂F
∂α
∗
(K∗) < ∂F
∂α
m
(Lm, Km), where
both terms integrate the same function over the respective area as shown in Figure 3. The
difference between ∂F
∂α
∗
(K∗) and ∂F
∂α
m
(Lm, Km) lies in the shaded area. Comparing integrations
over the triangles and the trapezium, we can conclude that the above condition is satisfied because
the triangles have higher values of x or y.
y
x
Lm+Km
K*
Lm+Km K*
Figure 3: Investment under Social Optimum and Monopoly.
We therefore have
• If ∂F
∂α
m
< 0, then ∂F
∂α
∗
< 0. Both ∂K
∂α
∗
, ∂K
∂α
m
> 0, which is true for small cK .
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• If ∂F
∂α
∗
> 0, then ∂F
∂α
m
> 0. Both ∂K
∂α
∗
, ∂K
∂α
m
< 0, which is true for large cK .
• For medium cK , ∂F∂α
∗
< 0 and ∂F
∂α
m
> 0. Then, ∂K
∂α
∗
> 0 and ∂K
∂α
m
< 0.
Thus, under social optimum there is a larger range of cK under which investment increases with
correlation as compared to the monopoly case.
E Linear Example
E.1 Social Optimum
The relationship between investment in flexible resource and demand correlation at the social
optimum is slightly different when demands are uniformly distributed. To see this, consider a joint
distribution h(x, y) as follows:
• Positive correlation. With probability ρ, only pairs of demands on the x = y line are possible
(perfect positive correlation). With probability 1− ρ, demands are uniformly distributed on
a unit square [0, 1] × [0, 1] (independent demands). We can use ρ as a measure of positive
correlation.
• Negative correlation. With probability ρ, only pairs of demands on the x + y = 1 line are
possible (perfect negative correlation). With probability 1−ρ, demands are uniformly spread
over a unit square [0, 1] × [0, 1] (independent demands). We can use −ρ as a measure of
negative correlation.
Since cK < cL < pi, all the F.O.C. are satisfied with equality. In the case of positive correlation,
the optimal capacity is chosen such that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost:
ρ(1− K
2
) + (1− ρ)1
2
(2−K)2 = cK .
Note that K ≥ 1 because cK ≤ 0.5. Differentiating K with respect to ρ, we find that K∗ increases
with ρ.
In the case of negative correlation, we have
K∗ = max
{
1, 2−
√
2cK
1− ρ
}
.
Note that K ≥ 1. The reason is that if demands are perfectly negatively correlated and investment
is less than 1, then marginal benefit always exceeds cost. When K > 1, the optimal investment is
determined by
(1− ρ)1
2
(2−K)2 = cK .
It is easy to see that K∗ increases with −ρ.
We therefore have
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Result 1. In the case of uniformly distributed demands, the social planner only invests in the
flexible resource, and the socially optimal investment always increases with demand correlation.
The reason is that, for uniformly distributed demands, the marginal benefit of expanding
capacity always increases as correlation increases.
E.2 Monopoly Case
In the monopoly case, the result in the linear example is the same as Proposition 3 in the main
text. To keep things simple, further assume that cK ∈ [0.25, 0.5] such that L1 + K and L2 + K
are smaller than 1. In the case of positive correlation, the monopolist chooses K such that
ρ(
1
2
− K
2
) + (1− ρ)(3
4
−K − 1
2
K2) = cK .
In the case of negative correlation, the monopolist choice of K solves
ρ(1− 2K) + (1− ρ)(3
4
−K − 1
2
K2) = cK .
We therefore have
Result 2. In the case of uniformly distributed demands, there is positive local investment; and
the monopolist’s investment in flexible resource increases with demand correlation if cK is small,
but decreases with demand correlation if cK approaches cL.
F Competition Improves Social Welfare
Competition always increases social welfare because it mitigates the underinvestment and over-
investment problem.
• Kd ≥ Km: The F.O.C. of K in the monopoly case is
{III}+ {IV }+ {V } = cK .
As for the duopoly case, we refer to Equation (12) in FF: the F.O.C. of K is
1−D(K) = cK ,
where D(K) is the demand for the flexible resource. Since firms only buy the flexible resource
when demand is above their local capacity, this condition can be rewritten as
{III}+ {IV }+ {V }
1− ∫ L1
0
∫ L2
0
h(x, y)dydx
= cK .
Therefore, Kd ≥ Km because 1− ∫ L1
0
∫ L2
0
h(x, y)dydx < 1. Note that Kd = Km only when
L1, L2 = 0.
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• pd ≤ pm: Under duopoly, providers of the flexible resource randomize over price with the
upper bound of pi (see Proposition 7 of FF).
• Ld ≤ Lm: Firms invest less in local resource under duopoly because the price of it is lower.
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Chapter III
Ex Ante and Ex Post Investments in
Cybersecurity
This paper develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity in which the
software vendor can invest ex ante and ex post. The regulator can use safety standards
and liability rules as means of increasing security. A standard is a minimum level
of safety, and a liability rule states the amount of damage each party is liable for.
I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to
underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post because the software vendor does
not suffer the full costs of the society in case of security failure. Instead, switching
to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve
security, the regulator should encourage not only the firms, but also the enterprises to
invest in security. I also discuss the effect of network externality and explain why firms
engage in “vaporware”.
Keywords: cybersecurity, sequential investment, standards, liability
JEL Classification: L1, L8
1 Introduction
New security concerns are constantly arising as privacy breaches proliferate and cyber attacks
escalate. For example, a recent data breach on an unprecedented scale saw more than 1.2 billion
credentials stolen by a Russian criminal group.1 Moreover, we continue to see the rise of “ran-
somware” (a malicious program that encrypts files on the victim’s computer and demands a fee
I thank Giacomo Calzolari and Jacques Cre´mer for their helpful comments. Any opinions expressed are those
of the author only.
1See “Russia gang hacks 1.2 billion usernames and passwords,” BBC News, August 6 2014, available at http:
//www.bbc.com/news/technology-28654613.
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before unlocking those files), the discovery of security flaws on smartphones, and the emergence
of new security risks from the “Internet of Things” (such as hackers stealing sensitive data from
owners of Internet-connected objects—from locks, lights, thermostats, televisions, refrigerators,
washing machines, to cars). A critical gap has thus emerged between firms’ investment in cy-
bersecurity and today’s rapidly evolving technological advances, which warrants further research.
More particularly, good security depends on more than just the technology. It requires a deeper
understanding of the incentives of the agents who sell as well as those who use the technology. In
the software industry, the incentives of those who are responsible for security and those who suffer
from a security problem are often misaligned: while software vendors are motivated to minimize
their own private costs, the social planner’s goal is to minimize society’s costs. Firms’ incentives
to invest are therefore suboptimal.2
The purpose of this paper is to understand how to use legislation such as safety standards
and liability rules to provide incentives for software firms to make their product more secure. A
standard is a minimum level of safety set by the regulator, and a liability rule states the amount of
damage each party is liable for. In practice, there are different types of security standards, such as
encryption standards, security breach notification standards, IT continuity standards, set by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Center for Internet Security (CIS)
in the U.S., and more widely by the International Organization for Standards (ISO) and Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). As for negligence liability, consumers continue to file lawsuits
against firms for security breaches, data leakage, and infringement of privacy, and in this regard,
these firms might be held accountable for consumer damages. This raises a number of interesting
questions: Which of the interventions, standards or liability rules, would better incentivize firms
and consumers to behave optimally? Should standards and liability rules be used separately or
jointly? Is it socially optimal to shift some of the cost of investing in security from firms to
consumers? To address these questions, I develop a model to study the investment incentives of
a software firm when its software is subject to security problems and when consumers bear some
precaution costs.
This paper makes two contributions. First, it studies a new type of inefficiency in the cyber-
security market, which is due to software vendors failing to take into account of consumers’ cost
of investing in security. Taking precautions is in general less costly for ordinary consumers as
they only need to reboot their machines and the process of updating security is mostly automatic
nowadays. However, the cost of precautions is significant for enterprise users, especially when they
adopt sophisticated firewalls, cryptographic protocols, virus detection techniques, intrusion detec-
tion systems, data-loss prevention features, among others. Top-notch security tools are expensive
and require a large number of man-hours to maintain and manage them. They are especially im-
portant for financial services, telecommunication sectors and government departments. Second, I
introduce two types of investment the firms can undertake: ex ante care and ex post maintenance.
2See Anderson, Clayton and Moore (2009), and Anderson and Moore (2009) for surveys of the economics of
network security.
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In the software industry, as software is always evolving and adding new functionalities, they are
never free of bugs. There are usually multiple rounds of debugging. Therefore, it is common for
the software industry to have sequential investments. I further show that such possibility of se-
quential investments may lead to “vaporware” practice even in the absence of preemptive motives
and reputation concerns: because ex ante and ex post investments are substitutes, allowing firms
to identify security problem ex post increases the likelihood of releasing a less secure software
product ex ante—a new perspective in the vaporware literature. In Sections 3.1 and 4, I also
explore the consequences of public policies such as subsidizing the training of computer experts,
synchronizing patch release and adoption cycles, and implementing vulnerability management by
a third party.
To be more specific, I consider a model in which a firm sells software that is subject to potential
security problems. The firm can invest ex ante to increase the security level and ex post to find
the security problem before the hacker. If the firm discovers the bug, it can choose whether to
disclose it or hide it. If the firm discloses the bug information, consumers can choose whether
to take precaution or not. Consumers differ in their costs of taking precaution: actions are more
costly for the laymen than for the computer experts.
I find that since the firm does not suffer the full costs of the society in case of security failure,
its incentives to invest are suboptimal: it underinvests ex ante and overinvests ex post. I also show
that there are inefficiencies associated with the joint use of a full liability rule and an optimal
standard to increase security. Interestingly, a partial liability rule, which shifts some liability to the
consumers, can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that policies that encourage consumers and
firms to share the costs of security could improve security. For example, since applying patches and
malware-removal tools are costly for enterprise customers, the government could try to encourage
them to put more effort in finding, testing and installing these tools as soon as the vendor makes
them available. These results continue to hold in the presence of network externality.
I also show that if the firm has limited liability, increasing the number of computer experts
mitigates suboptimal investment incentives. The reason is that the difference between the private
and social incentives to invest arises from two effects. First, the firm does not pay fully for the
damage, and the total amount of damage is decreasing in the number of experts. Second, the firm
ignores the precautionary costs of the consumers when it makes its investment decision, and the
total cost of precaution is increasing in the number of experts. When the firm has limited liability,
the first effect dominates. This implies that to alleviate the inefficiency, the government can either
impose limited liability on the firm and increase the number of computer experts, or simply allocate
more liability to the firm. More particularly, under limited liability, the government can provide
a subsidy for training in the area of cybersecurity so that enterprises become more competent
in managing security threats. In contrast, if the firm bears substantial liability for consumers’
damage, then the government needs to be careful about increasing the number of experts because
the objectives of the planner and the firm will become more divergent.
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1.1 Literature
This paper is primarily related to recent works on the economics of security investment. Gor-
don and Loeb (2002) and Kunreuther and Heal (2003) study the optimal security investment.
Kunreuther and Heal (2003) consider the presence of network externality, but Gordon and Loeb
(2002) do not. Both of them consider simultaneous investment, while I focus on sequential in-
vestment. Varian (2004) examines full liability in a model in which efforts of multiple parties are
needed to increase security. He finds that liability should be assigned entirely to the party who
can best manage the risk. Different from his analysis, I also consider partial liability, and the joint
effect of partial liability and standards.
This paper also relates to the economics and legal literature on tort laws, but it departs
from this literature by considering the possibility of consumers taking actions and sequential
investments. More specifically, Shavell (1984) and Kolstad et al. (1990) compare standards
with liability rules. However, Shavell’s analysis is based on the inefficiencies associated with
the potential bankruptcy of the firm and the uncertainty of lawsuit by the consumers, while the
inefficiencies studied by Kolstad et al. are due to the uncertainty over the legal standard to which
the firm will be held liable. Differently, inefficiencies here are caused by the firm failing to take
into account of consumers’ costs of investing in security. Moreover, the literature on torts has
tended to focus on either ex ante investment, as in Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2006), or ex
post investment, as in Polinsky and Shavell (2010);34 whereas this paper deals with both.
Finally, this paper shares with the literature on disclosure laws (see, for example, Granick
(2005) and Choi et al. (2010)) the focus on the tradeoff that arises from disclosing software
vulnerabilities: while secrecy prevents attackers from taking advantage of publicized security flaws,
it interferes with scientific advancement in security, which is largely based on information sharing
and cooperation. Choi et al. also examine the effect of a mandatory disclosure policy and a “bug
bounty” program on welfare. However, they take security investments as given, and do not discuss
optimal investment. Daughety and Reinganum (2005) study the effect of confidential settlement
on product safety, but their focus is not on investment. This paper extends this literature by
analyzing the optimal investment in security, and such investment is of two kinds: ex ante care
and ex post maintenance.
2 The Model
Monopoly software vendor. Consider a firm that produces a software product which contains
potential bugs. For simplicity, I assume away prices, so that the problem is simplified to choosing
a level of security that minimizes the sum of the costs. The assumption is reasonable for con-
3See Daughety and Reinganum (2013) for a survey of the literature on torts.
4Polinsky and Shavell analyze information acquisition about product risks when product quality is uncertain.
Therefore, their problem concerns ex post, rather than ex ante, investment.
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sumers who have already bought the software and are therefore not concerned about the prices.
Moreover, if the firm generates profit from channels other than selling the software product such
as advertisement, then the objective is simply to minimize the costs.
Heterogeneous consumers. There is a unit mass of consumers. Consumers have different
precaution costs: a proportion α of them are “computer experts” and have precaution cost γ
drawn from a distribution F (γ) ∼ [0,+∞), while the others are “laymen” with γ = ∞. Experts
are security professionals who can take security precautions such as monitoring the system for
attacks and patching the system if the firm discloses the presence of a security problem, while
laymen without such professional knowledge will never take precautions.5 In the main text, all
experts have the same γ and there are two types of consumers, but in Appendix A I show that the
results are robust to the introduction of a continuum of consumer types. Assume that consumers
always have positive utility in using the software.
Timing of the game. (i) The firm invests s in security at a cost c(s). This is ex ante care.
Such investment could take the form of improvement in infiltration detection or authentication
technologies. (ii) By investing m(b) in ex post maintenance, the firm will find a bug before the
hacker does with probability b. Let p(s) be the probability that the hacker will attack. I assume
away strategic attacks.6 (iii) If the firm discovers a bug, it can choose whether or not to disclose
the security problem. Assume that there is no cost in disclosing the bug. For example, the firm
can simply post the information on its website. However, disclosure increases the probability of
attack by a small .7 (iv) If the firm discloses a bug, the experts can choose whether or not to
take precaution.
Assumption 1. c′(0) = 0, c′(s) > 0, c′′(s) > 0, c′′′(s) > 0,m′(0) = 0,m′(b) > 0,m′′(b) >
0,m′′′(b) > 0, p′(s) < 0, and p′′(s) > 0.
Under Assumption 1, investment costs c(s) and m(b) are thrice differentiable, convex, and
increasing in s and b respectively;8 and that probability of attack p(s) is convex and decreasing in
s.
Damage. For the firm, the damage incurred from an attack is η in case the hacker discovers
the bug before the firm does, and η in case the firm identifies the bug first. Assume that η > η.
This could be the financial loss caused by stolen information of the firm becoming available to the
hacker. Such loss is smaller if the firm finds the bug first as it can then try to fix the problem.
5I assume that consumers take precaution after the firm has disclosed the information about the bug. One could
alternatively think of consumers taking precaution ex ante. However, the qualitative result will not change as long
as the costs associated with these precautions are not borne by the firm.
6Strategic attacks are modeled in, for instance, Acemoglu et al. (2013). They show that strategic targeting
provides additional incentives for overinvestment in security because larger investment shifts attacks from one agent
to another.
7Arora, Nandkumar and Telang (2006) show empirically that in some cases vulnerability disclosure increases
the frequency of attacks.
8The third derivatives ensure that the profit function is well-behaved.
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However, the firm may face substantial loss if the hacker exploits a bug that has not been previously
identified—a phenomenon known as “zero-day attacks”. For the consumers, the damage from an
attack is µ if they do not take precaution and µ if they do. This could be monetary loss due
to fraudulent use of their personal information. Assume that µ > µ, meaning once informed,
consumers can take actions to mitigate the risk of being attacked. Let λ ∈ [0, 1] denote the part
of consumers’ damages for which the firm is liable. I focus on three liability regimes:
• Full liability, under which the firm is liable for all damages faced by the consumers, i.e. λ = 1;
• Partial liability, under which the firm only compensates consumers partially, i.e. λ ∈ (0, 1);
• No liability, under which consumers will not receive any compensation from the firm, i.e. λ =
0.
Thus, the total loss for the firm is η + λµ, where η ∈ [η, η] and µ ∈ [µ, µ].
3 Optimal Investment
I now work backward from the last stage. When the firm discloses a bug, the expected damage
for a consumer who does not take precaution is p(s)µ, and that for a consumer who takes precaution
is p(s)µ+ γ. Therefore, the consumer will take precaution if
γ < p(s)(µ− µ). (1)
In the disclosure stage, the firm can choose its disclosure policy in case it discovers a bug. If it
does not disclose the security problem, its expected cost is p(s)(η + λµ). If it chooses to disclose,
there are two cases. If consumers take precaution, the firm incurs a cost of p(s)[η+λ(αµ+(1−α)µ)].
However, if consumers do not take precaution, the cost becomes p(s)(η + λµ).9 Therefore, the
firm will only disclose if this leads consumers to take precaution, that is, if Equation (1) holds.
In the investment stage, the firm chooses s and b to minimize its expected loss, which is denoted
by Lf .
min
b,s
Lf = (1− b)p(s)(η + λµ)
+ b
{∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
p(s)[η + λ(αµ+ (1− α)µ)]dF (γ) +
∫ ∞
p(s)(µ−µ)
p(s)(η + λµ)dF (γ)
}
+m(b) + c(s). (2)
Let bm(s) denote the firm’s optimal ex post investment strategy given ex ante security s, and let
s∗ and b∗ ≡ bm(s∗) denote the solutions of Equation (2).
9When consumers do not take precaution, the firm is indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing. However,
by assuming that disclosure would increase the probability of attack by , the firm will strictly prefer not to disclose.
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The first term in Equation (2) is the expected cost of the firm when the hacker discovers the
bug first, and in which case both the firm and the consumers suffer a large damage. When the
firm finds the bug before the hacker, either it discloses the bug if consumers’ cost is small, which is
captured by the second term, or it does not disclose if consumers’ cost is large, which is captured
by the third term. In this case, the firm suffers a small damage from attack because it identifies
the bug sooner than the hacker, while the extent of damages suffered by the consumers depends
on whether precautionary measures are taken. The last two terms represent ex ante and ex post
investment costs.
The social planner’s incentive to disclose is the same as the firm, that is, the planner will
disclose as long as γ is small enough. However, different from the firm, if the planner chooses to
disclose, its expected cost is p(s)(η + αµ+ (1− α)µ) + αγ, which is higher than that of the firm.
This is because the planner also takes into account consumers’ cost of taking precautions, and
internalizes all the costs, so there is no liability issue. In case of non-disclosure, the expected cost
is p(s)(η + µ).
The social planner chooses s and b to minimize the expected loss of the society, which is denoted
by LSP .
min
b,s
LSP =(1− b)p(s)(η + µ) + b
{∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
[p(s)(η + αµ+ (1− α)µ) + αγ]dF (γ)
+
∫ ∞
p(s)(µ−µ)
p(s)(η + µ)dF (γ)
}
+m(b) + c(s)
=Lf |λ=1 + bα
∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
γdF (γ). (3)
Let bSP (s) denote the social planner’s optimal ex post investment strategy given ex ante security
s, and let so and bo ≡ bSP (so) denote the solutions of Equation (3).
The difference between Lf and LSP is that the firm minimizes its own private costs, while the
social planner minimizes the sum of firm’s and consumers’ costs.
Lemma 1. Under full liability (λ = 1), bm(s) and bSP (s) decrease with s.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 1 shows that the firm has less incentive to find bugs ex post given a high security level
ex ante, meaning that ex ante and ex post investments are substitutes.
Lemma 2. Under full liability (λ = 1), bm(s) > bSP (s) for all s. In particular, if the standard
is set at the socially optimal level, s∗ = so, the firm will overinvest in ex post maintenance,
bm(so) > bSP (so).
Proof. See Appendix C.
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One might expect that under full liability and an optimal standard the firm will invest op-
timally, but it turns out differently when consumers also bear some costs in protecting their
computers. The intuition runs as follows. If a bug is not found, both the firm and the society
suffer the same loss. If a bug is discovered, the firm can reduce the loss more than the planner
because it does not bear the costs of the consumers. Since the firm has more to gain in finding
the bug, it will overinvest.
I assume that full liability is defined for “net” damages to the consumers. One can alternatively
define it for “total” damages, which includes also consumers’ precaution cost. In this case, full
liability alone is enough to restore the first-best. I model the liability regime the way I did because
in practice, firms are typically liable for financial damages to the consumers caused by, for example,
a data breach. Liability sometimes also covers for litigation costs, but very rarely for investment
costs in precaution. One difficulty lies in estimating the amount of time and effort consumers
spent on managing, maintaining and patching a system.
Proposition 1. (Full Liability). Under full liability (λ = 1), the firm underinvests in ex ante
care, s∗ < so, and overinvests in ex post maintenance, b∗ > bo.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 1 shows that full liability alone does not achieve the first-best solution. The reason
is that, as shown in Lemma 2, ex post the firm has more to gain in finding the bug than the planner,
and hence it invests too much in ex post maintenance. The firm invests too little in ex ante care
because it expects to overinvest ex post, as was shown in Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. (Partial Liability). The socially optimal level of investment, so and bo, can be
achieved with the joint use of an optimal standard so and a partial liability rule λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix E.
When security standards are set at the socially optimal level, it is inefficient to implement full
liability because the firm will overinvest ex post ; it is also inefficient to set firm’s liability to zero
because it will then underinvest ex post. As a consequence, the optimal liability rule is a partial
one. Note that in Appendix F I show that if liability regime is the only instrument of public
policies, it is not enough to provide the right incentives for two investments.
3.1 Network Externality
In this subsection, I consider direct and indirect network effects. In practice, users whose
computers are infected may create negative externalites on the other users in that attackers can
use these computers to host phishing sites, distribute spam e-mails or other unlawful content.
Kunreuther and Heal (2003), August and Tunca (2006), Acemoglu et al. (2013), and Riordan
(2014), for instance, examine agents’ incentive to invest in security under the presence of network
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externalities. While they focus on one type of security investment, this paper deals with two
types.10
Let us first examine the situation with indirect network effects in which the firm’s investment
strategy is affected by the proportion of consumers taking precaution.
Corollary 1. (Indirect network effects). When λ is large, increasing the proportion of computer
experts, α, exacerbates the ex ante underinvestment and ex post overinvestment problems. When
λ is small, increasing α mitigates the investment problem.
Proof. See Appendix G.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 runs as follows. Comparing Equations (2) with (3), the
difference between the private and social incentives to invest that is related to α arises from the
following.
p(s) (1− λ)(αµ+ (1− α)µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
distortion from liability assignment
+ αγ︸︷︷︸
distortion from consumers′ costs
.
Investment incentives are therefore distorted by two forces: first, the firm does not pay fully for
the damage; second, the firm ignores the precautionary costs of the consumers when it makes its
investment decision. If the firm is held liable for a large proportion of damage (i.e. λ is large), then
reducing the proportion of experts (α) mitigates suboptimal investment incentives. The reason
is that an increase in firm’s liability reduces the first type of distortion, whereas a decrease in
the proportion of experts reduces the second type of distortion. Taking the effects together, the
objectives of the planner and the firm become more aligned, and thus this reduces the extent
that the firm is investing suboptimally. If, on the other hand, the firm is held liable for a smaller
proportion of damage, then increasing the proportion of experts will reduce the inefficiency. This
is because the extent of the first type of distortion depends on the total amount of damage, and is
decreasing in α, whereas the extent of the second type of distortion depends on the total cost of
precaution of the consumers, and is increasing in α. When the firm has limited liability, the first
type of distortion dominates.
This implies that to alleviate the inefficiency, the government can either impose limited liability
on the firm and increase the number of computer experts, or simply allocate more liability to the
firm. More particularly, under limited liability, the government can provide a subsidy for training in
the area of cybersecurity so that enterprises become more competent in managing security threats.
For example, many security breaches involve attackers trying to compromise users’ accounts, and
users are sometimes unaware of such attack. Even if they are aware of the attack, they sometimes
lack the skills needed to resolve the security problem. Therefore, increasing training that aims
to enhance the technical skills of these enterprise users appears to be appropriate provided that
10More particularly, August and Tunca (2006) focus on the problem of patch management, and therefore consider
ex post investment only. Security investments are strategic complements in Kunreuther and Heal (2003), strategic
substitutes in Acemoglu et al. (2013), and can be strategic complements or strategic substitutes in Riordan (2014)
depending on whether the attacks are direct or indirect, but agents can only invest once in these models.
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the cost of implementing this subsidy is not too large. In contrast, if the firm bears substantial
liability for consumers’ damage, then the government needs to be careful about increasing the
number of experts because the objectives of the planner and the firm would further diverge. That
being said, this does not mean that offering cybersecurity training is undesirable (e.g. it could
potentially generate cost savings for firms through detecting, defending against and recovering
from cyber-attacks), but that the potential adverse effects on incentives should not be ignored.
Previously, I have assumed that there are no direct network effects, but my qualitative results
would not change even if we add this. Re-interpreting ex post investment as a patch release and
consumers’ action as the choice of patch installation, direct network effects between consumers
could arise when consumers who do not patch increase the security risks on other consumers, and
consumers who patch reduce the probability of others being attacked. In this case, increasing the
proportion of experts α will lower the damage to all experts, µ, and that to all laymen, µ, meaning
only magnitude changes. However, the main qualitative result of liability-sharing between the firm
and the consumers remains valid, provided consumers have to take precautionary actions.
4 Discussion
Vaporware.—“Vaporware” refers to the software industry practice of announcing new prod-
ucts well in advance of their actual release on the market.11 The previous literature, for instance,
Bayus et al. (2001) and Haan (2003), studies how such product pre-announcements can be used
as a means of entry deterrence in a signaling model. Choi et al. (2010) examine how reputation
concerns may induce firms to make honest announcements in a repeated cheap-talk game. Al-
though vaporware practice typically means the release dates of the products are much later than
the original announced dates, we could alternatively view the announced product as a product
characteristics (a security feature, for instance) instead of the physical product. Vaporware could
then be interpreted as delivering a lower-quality product than promised, which is consistent with
the current development in the industry: software products, mobile applications, and smart-home
appliances are often launched prematurely while they are still in development and are therefore
susceptible to security risks. The result of ex ante underinvestment in security in this model
captures the essence of this situation. Moreover, I show that underinvestment may occur even in
the absence of preemptive motives and reputation concerns. This is therefore different from the
vaporware literature, where firms engage in vaporware only to prevent entry or when reputational
concern is not so important. The new insight here is that the possibility of sequential investments,
which allows the firm also to invest ex post in fixing the security problem, provides an alternative
explanation at least in part for vaporware practice in the software market.
Policy Implications.—I have examined the investment incentive of a software vendor, both ex
11Vaporware may also mean the announced products never reach the market, but this is not the focus of this
paper because the firm always introduces the product in this model.
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ante and ex post, when consumers bear some costs of taking precaution. I find that security can be
improved with the joint use of an optimal standard and a partial liability rule. This implies that the
regulator can enforce some minimum standards for encryption and security breach notification.
Sanctions can be imposed if these requirements are violated. Another policy we can consider
is liability regime. Interestingly, I find that, given an optimal standard, shifting some liability
to the consumers is welfare improving. This means that the regulator should not impose a one
hundred percent liability on the software vendor because this will distort its investment incentives.
Instead, an effective policy is to ask both the software vendor and its customers to share the costs
of security.12
Despite the fact that users dislike or feel concerned about security problems, some of them
ignore notifications from the vendor and do not take up any of the proposed solutions. For
example, more than 90% of ChoicePoint customers whose personal information had been stolen
did not take up the mitigating solutions offered by the firm such as free credit monitoring service
and insurance after the data breach.13 This may be due to the fact that consumers have other
competing demands on their time, and paying attention to data breach notifications appears to
be low on their priority list.
On enterprise level, installing patches could be costly especially for large companies because
the plethora of security updates can often overwhelm software engineers, who have to keep track of
all relevant bugs and patches, and match the version of all those updates to the version of software
their company is using. Once a problem is identified, they need to figure out which updates get
priority, and look for solutions to deal with it.14 In addition, if the installation requires rebooting
an enterprise’s critical system, downtime can be expensive. As a consequence, this could easily
lead to the missing of some major security updates.
This suggests that a desirable policy should try to eliminate the delay in applying the solutions
to security problems. First, the government could persuade or mandate the users to react more
quickly (for example, within a predetermined window of time) as soon as the vendor makes the
solutions available and notifies them in a reasonable way. Second, third parties can be introduced
to help enterprises to find, select and deploy the solutions that are relevant to their systems. An
example of third-party vulnerability management that helps businesses to adhere to compliance
and security standards in the IT and financial sectors is Qualys, Inc.
12Although this discussion interprets costs of security as a form of liability, they are different from the costs
explained by γ in that consumers ignoring or not noticing security alerts is not an investment, but rather it shows
a systematic lack of security consciousness. This raises the question of who should be responsible for the damages
that arise from such negligence.
13See Jon Brodkin, “Victims of ChoicePoint Data Breach Didn’t Take Advantage of Free Offers,” Network World,
April 10, 2007, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/041007-choicepoint-victim-offers.html?page=
1.
14Practitioners have commonly considered patch management as a time- and resource-consuming activity. See, for
instance, Symantec, “Automating Patch Management,” February 8, 2005, http://www.symantec.com/articles/
article.jsp?aid=automating_patch_management.
66
More General Applications.—The analysis also provides insight into other industries in which
sequential investments are important, such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals. We can then re-
interpret the seller as a firm that produces a product with some safety features. There are again
two types of investments the firm can undertake: ex ante investment in pre-sale product design,
and ex post investment in post-sale product testing. For example, ex ante investment could lead
to the development of a new technology in cars that is subject to potential safety defect, or a new
drug that has previously unknown side effects. The firm can invest ex post to remedy these safety
problems. We can then use the previous analysis to study investment incentives of the firm, in
particular whether there are incorrect incentives to provide safety ex ante and ex post and how to
improve them.
5 Conclusion
To increase security, the key is not so much about holding the software vendor solely liable
for the loss, but balancing the investment incentives between different players. This discussion
represents a useful first step towards understanding sequential security investments. In future
work, it might be interesting to relax the single-firm assumption and consider dynamic issues and
contagion issues in a network of multiple firms.15
A Continuum of Consumers
With a slight abuse of the notation, suppose that there is a continuum of consumers whose
precaution cost γ is drawn from a distribution F (γ) ∼ [0,+∞). As before, consumers will take
precaution if γ < p(s)(µ− µ), and the marginal consumer, who is indifferent between taking and
not taking precaution, is given by γ(s) ≡ p(s)(µ− µ).
If the firm does not disclose the bug, its expected cost is p(s)(η + λµ); if it discloses the bug,
it expected cost is p(s)[η + λ(F (γ(s))µ + (1 − F (γ(s)))µ)]. Since the latter is smaller than the
former, the firm will always disclose. Therefore, the firm chooses s and b to minimize
min
b,s
Lf = (1− b)p(s)(η + λµ) + bp(s)[η + λ(F (γ(s))µ+ (1− F (γ(s)))µ)] +m(b) + c(s). (A.1)
As for the planner, the cost for non-disclosure is p(s)(η+ µ), whereas the cost for disclosure is
p(s)[η + F (γ(s))µ + (1 − F (γ(s)))µ] + ∫ γ(s)
0
γdF (γ). Since the latter is smaller than the former,
15See, for instance, Morris (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2013), and Goyal et al. (2014) for treatment of contagion in
networks.
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the planner will always disclose. The planner therefore solves
min
b,s
LSP = (1− b)p(s)(η + µ)
+ b
{
p(s)[η + F (γ(s))µ+ (1− F (γ(s)))µ] +
∫ γ(s)
0
γdF (γ)
}
+m(b) + c(s). (A.2)
It is easy to see that since
∫ γ(s)
0
γdF (γ) > 0, LSP > Lf for any λ. Thus, the main results of ex
ante underinvestment and ex post overinvestment carry through.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Since λ = 1, the first-order conditions with respect to b are given by
∂LSP
∂b
= 0,
⇔ m′(b) = p(s)(η + µ)−
∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
[p(s)(η + αµ+ (1− α)µ) + αγ]dF (γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
GSP (s)
−
∫ ∞
p(s)(µ−µ)
p(s)(η + µ)dF (γ), (B.1)
and
∂Lf
∂b
= 0,
⇔ m′(b) = p(s)(η + µ)−
∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
p(s)(η + αµ+ (1− α)µ)dF (γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gf (s)
−
∫ ∞
p(s)(µ−µ)
p(s)(η + µ)dF (γ). (B.2)
The right hand sides of Equations (B.1) and (B.2) are decreasing in s.
C Proof of Lemma 2
We can see from Equations (B.1) and (B.2) that if s∗ = so, then Gf (so) < GSP (so). Thus,
bm(so) > bSP (so).
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D Proof of Proposition 1
Since λ = 1, the first-order conditions with respect to s are given by
∂LSP
∂s
= 0,
⇔ − c
′(s)
p′(s)
= (1− b)(η + µ) + b
[∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
(η + αµ+ (1− α)µ)dF (γ)
+
∫ ∞
p(s)(µ−µ)
(η + µ)dF (γ)
]
, (D.1)
and
∂Lf
∂s
= 0,
⇔ − c
′(s)
p′(s)
= (1− b)(η + µ) + b
[∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
(η + αµ+ (1− α)µ)dF (γ)
+
∫ ∞
p(s)(µ−µ)
(η + µ)dF (γ)− αp(s)(µ− µ)2f(p(s)(µ− µ))
]
. (D.2)
Define the right hand side of Equation (D.1) as HSP (b), and that of Equation (D.2) as Hf (b).
Clearly, the left hand sides of Equations (D.1) and (D.2) are equal. However, HSP (bSP (s)) >
Hf (bSP (s)) > Hf (bm(s)). The first inequality follows from HSP (b) > Hf (b) for any b, whereas
the second inequality is due to the fact that Hf (b) is decreasing in b.
Since c′′′(s) > 0 and p′′′(s) > 0, it is easy to see that −c′(s)/p′(s) is convex and increasing in s,
and it has the limits lims→0−c′(s)/p′(s) = 0 and lims→∞−c′(s)/p′(s) =∞. As for the right hand
sides, the limits of both HSP (b) and Hf (b) are bounded away from∞ as s tends to∞. Moreover,
HSP (0) > 0, and if Hf (0) > 0, the solution to both equations exists, and we denote them by s∗
and so respectively. In addition, if the solution is unique, we must have s∗ < so due to the fact
that HSP (bSP (s)) > Hf (bm(s)).16
Using Lemma 1, if s∗ < so, then b∗ > bo.
E Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose s∗ = so. If λ = 1, Lemma 2 implies bm(so) > bSP (so). If λ = 0, Equation (B.2)
becomes
m′(b) = p(s)(η − η).
Comparing with Equation (B.1), bm(so) < bSP (so). Therefore, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
bm(so) = bSP (so).
16For example, there exists a unique equilibrium investment when both F (p(s)) and p(s)f(p(s)) are convex, and
m(b) is quadratic.
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F Liability regime as the only instrument
Suppose that there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that b∗ = bo and s∗ = so. This implies that ∂Lf/∂b =
∂LSP/∂b and ∂Lf/∂s = ∂LSP/∂s. However, we can easily verify that these two conditions cannot
be satisfied at the same time.
G Proof of Corollary 1
The difference between Equations (B.1) and (B.2) is
m′(b∗)−m′(bo) = α
∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
γdF (γ),
which is positive and increasing in α, meaning that a larger α worsens the ex post overinvestment
problem.
Similarly, the difference between Equations (D.1) and (D.2) is
(b∗ − bo)
[∫ p(s)(µ−µ)
0
(η + αµ+ (1− α)µ)dF (γ) +
∫ ∞
p(s)(µ−µ)
(η + µ)dF (γ)− (η + µ)
]
− αb∗p(s)(µ− µ)2f(p(s)(µ− µ)).
The first term (b∗ − bo) is positive and increasing in α, and the term in the square bracket is
negative and decreasing in α. The product of these two terms is thus negative and decreasing
α. Since the final term −αb∗p(s)(µ − µ)2f(p(s)(µ − µ)) is also negative and decreasing in α,
taken together the difference between Equations (D.1) and (D.2) is negative and decreasing in α,
meaning that the ex ante underinvestment problem is more severe as α increases.
This proof remains valid as long as λ is large enough.
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